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The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and 
heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked 
increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate 
affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and 
pitfalls of these measures, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential 
impact of ―shareholder democracy‖ on corporate stakeholders.  
This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the 
shareholder–stakeholder divide. Under this ―enlightened shareholder value‖ (ESV) 
approach, which has been introduced statutorily in the United Kingdom, attention to 
corporate stakeholders, including the environment, employees, and local communities, is 
seen as critical to generating long-term shareholder wealth.  
This Article observes that a similar paradigm is being advanced in the United States 
by leading institutional investors who also identify stakeholder interests as key to long-
term firm financial performance and effective risk management. It moves beyond prior 
literature by articulating a statement of the corporate purpose that is consistent with this 
investor-driven enlightened shareholder value approach and presents normative 
arguments in its favor. The Article then considers how enlightened shareholder value 
intersects with existing corporate governance rules in the United States and whether it 
implies managerial decision rules that align with or part course from the standard 
shareholder wealth maximization norm. In so doing, it offers a response to some of the 
concerns surrounding corporate stakeholders that have been raised by skeptics of greater 
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shareholder voice. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a rise in shareholder activism has sparked wide-ranging 
academic debate about the optimal role of shareholders in U.S. corporate governance and 
the benefits (and perils) of shareholder democracy.1 These debates have attracted public 
attention in the wake of the global financial crisis, which has led to calls for greater 
corporate accountability and prompted renewed interest in the power of shareholders to 
police corporate management. Although debate continues to rage over whether 
shareholders can and will restrain corporate mismanagement, the past year has seen a 
marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in 
corporate affairs, including most recently the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Reform Act).2  
An important undercurrent in the academic and popular controversy is the potential 
impact of shareholder democracy on corporate stakeholders, such as employees, 
creditors, the environment, and local communities.3 Director primacy proponents, who 
argue that control of the corporation is the proper purview of the board, not shareholders, 
note that corporate directors and officers already enjoy broad discretion under existing 
law to consider stakeholder interests. 4  Shareholder empowerment might then 
disadvantage stakeholders by compelling management to focus solely on shareholder 
wealth maximization. Powerful shareholders might also pressure management to transfer 
value from stakeholders to shareholders.5  
Opposite concerns are voiced as strongly that powerful shareholders will use their 
power to advance ―special interests,‖ realize short-term gains, or promote narrow causes 
to the detriment of the firm 6 —even though some of the ―causes‖ and ―interests‖ 
 
 1. See infra notes 29–51 and accompanying text. Shareholder activism has been defined broadly as ―the 
use of power by an investor . . . to influence the [behavior and impact] of a given portfolio firm [or firms].‖ 
Bruno Amann et al., Shareholder Activism for Corporate Social Responsibility: law and practice in the United 
States, Japan, France, and Spain, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 337 (2007). 
 2. See infra notes 26–39 and accompanying text (describing legislative initiatives and market changes 
preceding passage of the Act). Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 3. This Article uses the term ―stakeholder‖ to refer solely to nonshareholders who bear risk of harm or 
loss as a result of the firm‘s activities, following Max Clarkson‘s risk-based stakeholder model. See STUART 
COOPER, CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 39–41 (2004) (describing 
Clarkson‘s model) (citations omitted). As used here then, ―stakeholder‖ is identical in scope to the alternative, 
but more cumbersome term, ―nonshareholder constituencies‖ preferred by Stephen Bainbridge. See, e.g., 
Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547, 576 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. Other variants might include all actors who ―affect 
or are affected by‖ the corporation, but such definitions are too broad to be meaningful. See COOPER, supra at 
38–41 (introducing various alternatives). 
 4. See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (describing the positions of some director primacy 
advocates). 
 5. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (presenting concerns that shareholder empowerment 
potentially threatens stakeholders). 
 6. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (describing concerns that shareholder empowerment is 
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advanced are in fact the causes and interests of employees and other firm constituencies. 
In short, the problem with stakeholders is both that they might get too little attention and 
that they might get too much.  
This Article engages with this aspect of the shareholder democracy debate by 
advocating an ―enlightened shareholder value‖ vision of the corporate purpose that 
transcends the shareholder–stakeholder divide. Under this conception, attention to 
traditional ―stakeholder‖ interests such as the effect of corporate operations on the 
environment, employees, or local communities, is seen as a means of generating long-
term shareholder wealth and improving portfolio- and firm-level risk assessment. 
Enlightened shareholder value thus emphasizes the benefits to shareholders that can 
result from focusing corporate management on areas of shared shareholder and 
stakeholder concern while recognizing the very real challenges posed by the diversity of 
shareholder and stakeholder interests. At the same time, by asserting that shareholders 
should not achieve wealth through disregard for the impact of corporate decision making 
on stakeholders, enlightened shareholder value also parts course to some degree from the 
standard shareholder wealth maximization conception of the corporate purpose.  
Enlightened shareholder value is not a novel concept, but has in fact already been 
statutorily introduced in the United Kingdom under the U.K. Companies Act of 2006.7 
Theoretical precedent for the approach can be found in the narrower ―enlightened 
stakeholder value‖ theory advanced by economist Michael Jensen.8 It also has parallels in 
the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), which urge analysis of 
stakeholder interests as part of firm- and portfolio-level risk management.9 Although 
there are good reasons to doubt that regulatory reform in the United States will follow the 
path of the United Kingdom, this Article points to indications that an enlightened 
shareholder value model is emerging in the United States, in part at the behest of major 
institutional investors.  
A substantial literature spanning two decades has critically examined the role of 
institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance and supporting 
―responsible‖ business practices. Much of this literature concluded that institutional 
investor activism was unlikely to fulfill its hoped-for potential as a catalyst of corporate 
change, and cause for skepticism remains today.10 But the market and regulatory context 
has changed substantially since many of these studies of institutional investor activism 
were first undertaken. In particular, the rise of shareholder democracy has shifted the 
balance of corporate power toward shareholders, making their priorities more important 
to corporate boards. At the same time, movements across the economy favoring long-
term investment strategies, ―sustainable‖ business practices, and broader conceptions of 
 
wealth-reducing). 
 7. The term ―enlightened shareholder value‖ was first introduced in the legislation underlying the U.K. 
reforms to describe its stakeholder-oriented approach. See John Loughrey et al., Legal Practitioners, 
Enlightened Shareholder Value, and the Shaping of Corporate Governance, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 79, 82–87 
(2008) (tracing the development of the concept during the U.K. legislative process); Cynthia A. Williams & 
John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 
38 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 493, 515–17 (2005) (same). 
 8. See infra note 200 (introducing Jensen‘s theory). 
 9. See infra notes 107–09, 115 (introducing the UNPRI and its underlying rationales). 
 10. See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (surveying studies critical of institutional investor 
activism). 
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corporate accountability and risk management have created an environment in which 
shareholder and stakeholder interests are more likely to align.  
Clear signs of a pro-stakeholder orientation among leading institutional investors 
can already be seen in initiatives to incorporate environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) measures in firm and portfolio risk analysis, supported by both investor-led efforts 
to encourage sustainability reporting and trends in shareholder activism. To date 
CalPERS and other prominent public and union pension funds are at the forefront of 
many of these trends, with more moderate movement from mutual funds, which account 
for a significant percentage of U.S. equity holdings. 11  Nonetheless, because of its 
potential to generate long-term economic value for shareholders, facilitate more effective 
firm- and portfolio-level risk management, and improve the quality of information 
available to the markets, enlightened shareholder value—as defined in this Article—has 
appeal for mainstream investors and investment intermediaries that is already deepening 
its impact.  
Although a limited number of prior studies have explored the possibility of an 
investor-driven enlightened shareholder value model in the United States,12 this Article 
offers a new look at the potential of enlightened shareholder value to motivate market-
driven corporate reform in light of current investor practices and recent regulatory 
measures that amplify shareholder voice. This Article is also the first to consider the 
implications of enlightened shareholder value for dominant conceptions of the corporate 
purpose. Moving beyond prior literature, it squarely considers how enlightened 
shareholder value intersects with existing corporate governance rules in the United States 
and the extent to which the paradigm represents a challenge to the standard shareholder 
wealth maximization norm as a guide for managerial decision-making. It also advances 
normative arguments in favor of the approach. 
Part II sets a foundation for this investigation by reviewing the literature on 
institutional investor activism and outlining the nature of the ―stakeholder problem‖ 
within the shareholder empowerment debate. Part III considers the space for stakeholders 
under current corporate law rules. Part IV introduces the alternative perspective offered 
by an enlightened shareholder value paradigm, its underlying rationales, and evidence of 
its growing influence among mainstream investors and financial intermediaries. Part V 
assesses the extent to which enlightened shareholder value fits within and also, 
paradoxically, challenges fundamental aspects of shareholder wealth maximization. In so 
doing, this Article responds to some of the concerns surrounding corporate stakeholders 
that have been raised by critics of greater shareholder voice. 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.B (examining trends toward investor-driven enlightened shareholder value). On the 
scale of pension fund and mutual fund holdings in the U.S. equity market, see infra note 19. 
 12. See Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 523–30 (considering prospects for the United States to follow 
the United Kingdom‘s enlightened shareholder value approach); David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise 
of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221 (2007) (surveying public pension fund commitment to ―long-term responsible 
investment‖). 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: PANDORA’S BOX? 
In the Berle-Means corporation, the separation of ownership and control produces 
powerful corporate managers who are largely unrestrained by the dispersed and rationally 
apathetic shareholders on whose behalf they are obligated to act.13 For much of the past 
century this classic model was a fairly accurate description of the American public 
corporation. It has also been credited with the economic successes of the United States 
and other shareholder-oriented jurisdictions.14  
By the early 1990s, however, it had become apparent that U.S. equity shareholdings 
were increasingly concentrated among large institutional investors, that is, public and 
private pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks. This sparked 
strong academic interest in the potential of these large investors to serve as quasi-
regulators and true monitors of corporations and their boards.15 Much of this attention 
focused on the role of public pension funds because of the long-term investment 
perspective of their fund beneficiaries and the belief that these funds had fewer conflicts 
of interest, as compared to other institutional investors. This early optimism ultimately 
gave way in the face of considerable evidence of institutional investor passivity, short-
termism, complex and indeed, conflicting interests, and the limited impact of investor 
activism on corporate behavior.16  
However, one of the most striking developments impacting corporate America in 
recent years has been a dramatic shift in the balance of corporate power in the direction 
of shareholders, a shift which has reinvigorated interest in the questions surrounding 
institutional investor influence.17 This Article traces the rise of shareholder democracy 
 
 13. See generally ADOLF. A. BERLE & GARDINER. C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1968). Even in the absence of shareholder monitoring, there are other sources of potential restraint 
on managerial slack or misconduct, including the market for corporate control. See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1079–81 (7th ed. 2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 450, 468 (2001) (asserting that corporate governance in key commercial jurisdictions has converged 
toward the ―standard model‖ because the model has ―outcompeted‖ alternatives). 
 15. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 630–35 (2001) (summarizing the literature and describing institutional 
investor activism as ―the academic‘s panacea‖ for corporate governance reform). 
 16. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 176–82 (2001) (surveying the literature); 
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994) (tracing institutional and political foundations of the fragmentation of share ownership in the 
United States); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (identifying public pension funds‘ conflicts of interest and susceptibility to political 
influence); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 
GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (arguing that shareholder activism is unlikely to have a sustained impact as a source of 
corporate monitoring). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1151 (2010) (describing how certain forms of contingent debt incentivize shareholder opportunism at the 
expense of creditors and the long-term financial health of the firm); Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary 
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008) (arguing that the potential for self-interested 
shareholder activism necessitates the expansion of shareholder fiduciary duties); Randall S. Thomas, The 
Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
299 (2008) (introducing a symposium dedicated to institutional investors‘ role in corporate governance); 
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and identifies the ways in which concerns over stakeholders continue to impact the 
shareholder empowerment debate.  
A. Institutional Investor Power and the Rise of Shareholder Democracy 
Since the turn of the century, the concentration of U.S. equity shares held by 
institutional investors accelerated to the point that as of 2006, their holdings represented 
two-thirds of the value of all U.S. public equities.18 Even with sharp declines in the 
equity markets since that time, institutional investor holdings still account for over 40% 
of U.S. publicly traded shares. Public and private pension funds alone now control, on 
average, around 20% of all equity shares in the United States, while mutual funds account 
for another 15%. 19  Although diversification requirements prevent most institutional 
investors from owning 10% or more of any single portfolio company and most hold 
fewer than 3%,20 as of 2008 institutional investors together owned 64.5% of the largest 
1000 companies. 21  This concentration of ownership increases the likelihood that 
management will attend to shareholder concerns and lowers collective action barriers to 
active investment strategies,22 creating leverage that makes the benefits of activism more 
worth the costs to any one investor. In addition, regulatory changes in recent years have 
stimulated greater activism among institutional investors by reducing proxy solicitation 
and voting costs and lowering other obstacles to investor influence of corporate decision-
making.23  
 
Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public 
Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315 (2008) (drawing on empirical evidence to 
explore patterns of institutional investor activism); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for 
Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 53 (2008) (analyzing the impact of increased shareholder power on 
corporate stakeholders). See also infra notes 29–30 (surveying debates on the consequences of increased 
shareholder power). 
 18. CAROLYN K. BRANCATO & STEPHEN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 2008 INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTMENT REPORT 6, 9, 20, tbls.1, 10 (2008). For an earlier assessment of these trends, see generally JAMES 
P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 42–68 (2000). Direct ownership of 
publicly traded equities is also concentrated among a relatively small number of wealthy individuals. See 
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 509 (6th ed. 2007). 
 19. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHEN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 2009 INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTMENT REPORT24–25, tbl.12 (2009). Over the past decade, the percentage of the total U.S. equity markets 
held by pension funds, both public and private, has averaged closer to 25%, compared to an average of 20% for 
mutual funds. Id. As of 2008, public pension funds, such as CalPERS, which invest for the benefit of state and 
local public employees, accounted for roughly 6% of the total equity market (down from nearly 10% in 2006). 
Id. This figure represents less than half of the aggregate equity holdings by mutual funds, which in 2008 stood 
at 15.3% of all equities (down from 33.4% in 2006). Id. 
 20. On diversification restrictions, see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 520, 551–53 (1990); BAUMAN, supra note 18, at 509. 
 21. TONELLO & RABIMOV, supra note 19, at 26–27, tbls.13–14. The high concentration of institutional 
ownership among U.S. public companies was not impacted by the financial crisis. For nearly all of the top 25 
U.S. public companies, the ten largest institutional investors in the company account for roughly 20 to 30% of 
its total outstanding equity. Id. 
 22. See Black, supra note 20, at 570. 
 23. For example, in 1992, the SEC amended the definition of ―proxy solicitation‖ to remove most 
shareholder communications made without a formal proxy solicitation from the scope of federal regulation, and 
in 2007, amended the proxy solicitation rules to require Internet access to proxy materials, lowering cost 
barriers for activist investors. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 
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As a result, pension funds, hedge funds, and even major mutual funds now engage in 
various forms of shareholder activism, often in coordination with one another. These 
strategies range from voting corporate proxies to informal negotiations with management, 
to shareholder proposals, proxy contests and shareholder litigation.24 Recent empirical 
studies, while not uniform in their findings, indicate that in many cases investors‘ active 
monitoring can reduce agency costs and improve corporate financial performance.25  
Changing investment practices have also magnified shareholder voice. In their 
account of these trends, Anabtawi and Stout identify the rise of aggressive hedge funds, 
the emergence of shareholder proxy advisory services that concentrate investor voice, and 
the creation of complex financial instruments capable of separating voting rights and 
economic interests as key developments that have strengthened shareholder power.26 The 
importance of strong ―investor relations‖ is itself driving many companies to open new 
channels to engage with shareholders, including direct shareholder surveys and web-
based communications.27 
 
34-31326, 56 Fed. Reg. 48276 (Oct. 16, 1992); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-56135, 72 Fed. Reg. 42222 (Aug. 1, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). See Anabtawi & 
Stout, supra note 17, 1281 n.98 (describing the proxy solicitation changes and the e-proxy rules as among the 
most significant reforms that have increased shareholder power). Rules introduced by the SEC in 2002 requiring 
mutual funds to disclose how they vote corporate proxies were also intended to encourage mutual funds to 
exercise voting rights independent of management, although studies to date have not identified a significant 
impact on mutual fund activism. See David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, 2 ANN. 
REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 15–16 (2010) (reviewing empirical evidence).  
 24. See sources cited at supra note 17, infra notes 156–89 and accompanying text. 
 25. A rapidly expanding empirical literature has explored the impact of shareholder activism forms on 
corporate financial performance, but findings vary depending on the form of activism, the impact measures, the 
time period, and the activist and target characteristics assessed. See, e.g., Bonnie Buchanan et al., Proxy Rules 
and Proxy Practices: An Empirical Study of U.S. and U.K. Shareholder Proposals, (Sept. 15, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474062 (finding that shareholder proposals 
have positive, statistically significant effects on firms, and observing particularly strong effects for proposals by 
investors with large ownership stakes and those advocating certain governance reforms); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 301 n.54 (2009) (collecting empirical findings 
on hedge fund activism); Brad M. Barber, Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS‘ Activism (Nov. 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890321 (estimating financial gains from 
CalPERS governance activism); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 107 (2003) (finding that companies with stronger shareholder rights exhibited higher returns); Jonathan 
M. Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings (Aug. 
18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885365 (assessing comparability 
challenges in on a meta-study of the literature). But see Yermack, supra note 23, at 16 (reviewing empirical 
evidence that targets of pension fund activism implement governance reforms but without significant effects on 
accounting measures of corporate value); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance 
Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1814–15 (2008) (concluding that studies fail to show significant 
correlations between shareholder proposals and stock prices); Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Stark, The Evolution 
of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 67 (2007) (noting limited evidence 
of long-term effects of activism on corporate operations or financial performance). 
 26. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 17, at 1280–81. The Dodd–Frank Reform Act introduces new 
regulations for hedge funds, derivatives, and investment advisers that are intended to curb the kind of excessive 
risk-taking that may have driven some of the trends observed by Anabtawi and Stout. Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See also Yermack, supra 
note 23, at 7–12 (surveying empirical evidence on shareholder activism, including the influence of proxy 
advisors and the effect of delinking voting and economic rights on shareholder power). 
 27. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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Nonetheless, investors‘ propensity for shareholder activism varies widely. For 
institutional investors, the fund size, degree of diversification, relative size of holdings in 
a given portfolio company, degree of investment in equity, investment time horizon, the 
investor‘s commitment to non-financial performance, whether the fund is managed 
externally or internally, and the fund‘s compensation structure all impact the investor‘s 
level of activism and preferred approach.28 Moreover, despite the strong shareholder-
orientation of the American market and the market dominance of institutional investors—
both proponents and opponents of greater shareholder power acknowledge that legal and 
practical limits have impeded the exercise of shareholder control—so that corporate 
boards have generally exercised nearly exclusive control over corporate affairs.29 Over 
the past few years, these constraints have led to calls for deeper reforms that would 
expand shareholder voting rights and otherwise make corporate boards more directly 
accountability to shareholders.30  
Even before the passage of the Dodd–Frank Reform Act, many of these reforms had 
already been introduced or become standard practice among public companies in large 
part through the initiative of shareholders themselves. Through shareholder proposals 
under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 31  and various forms of 
engagement with corporate management, shareholders gained greater influence over 
corporate boards and attracted support for related legislative reforms. 32  Proposals to 
replace plurality with majority voting for director elections, eliminate classified boards, 
 
COMMITTEE ON DELINEATION OF GOVERNANCE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 14 (Aug. 1, 2009),  available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL260000pub/materials/20090801/delineation-final.pdf (surveying 
these developments). 
 28. See RODERICK MARTIN ET AL., INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT 36–59 (2007); Lori Verstegen Ryan & 
Marguerite Schneider, The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 554, 558 
(2002); Choi & Fisch, supra note 17, at 352 (identifying institutional investor size, in terms of total assets under 
management, as the factor most highly correlated with activism). 
 29. The primary disagreement between advocates and skeptics of shareholder power is whether this state 
of affairs is desirable or not. These limits include (i) state corporate law rules that limit shareholder voting rights 
to director elections, approval of charter and bylaw amendments, and veto of extraordinary corporate actions, 
(ii) limits on access to the corporate proxy, (iii) disincentives to formation of large blocks of stock, (iv) limits on 
shareholder coordination and communication, and (v) a lack of mechanisms for shareholders to exercise direct 
influence over either operational decisions or what Lucian Bebchuk has termed ―rules of the game‖ decisions. 
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW 43 (2003) 
(outlining arguments in favor of proxy access) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Access]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder 
Franchise] (proposing reforms to strengthen director accountability to shareholders); Black, supra note 20, at 
530–64 (highlighting legal obstacles to shareholder activism). See also Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra 
note 3, at 569–72 (2003) (―[S]hareholder control rights are so weak they scarcely qualify as part of corporate 
governance.‖); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of the Corporation, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 310–12 (1999) (describing obstacles to shareholders‘ ability to effect fundamental change). 
 30. See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 29; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power]; Bebchuk, 
Shareholder Franchise, supra note 29. 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
 32. During the 2009 proxy season, governance proposals won on average between 45 and 67% 
shareholder approval. 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISK METRICS, Dec. 15, 2009, 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_watchlist_2009 [hereinafter 2009 Proxy Scorecard]. On 
shareholder–management negotiations, see generally Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private 
Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171 (2009). 
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and expand shareholder rights to call special meetings have all received high levels of 
shareholder support in recent years.33 Shareholders have also sought greater leverage 
with management by pushing for ―say on pay‖ requirements that executive compensation 
be submitted to an advisory shareholder vote.34  
Though debate about the wisdom of such proposals remains heated,35 the recent 
passage of the Dodd–Frank Reform Act makes many of these rules mandatory for public 
corporations.36 For example, although majority voting was rejected in the final version of 
the Act, the legislation mandates ―say on pay,‖ enhanced executive compensation 
disclosure, and elimination of ―broker voting‖ for director elections, executive 
compensation, and other ―significant matters.‖37 This sweeping legislation followed on 
the heels of other new rules effective this year that eliminated broker voting for director 
elections, authorized some investors to weigh in on executive compensation, and 
expanded shareholder monitoring of corporate risk management. 38  The Act has also 
paved the way for the SEC to enact shareholder proxy access regulations that further 
empower shareholders.39 These new rules require companies to include a limited number 
of shareholder nominees for director elections in proxy materials at company expense, so 
long as the shareholder proponents meet certain eligibility requirements.40 In addition, 
 
 33. Under plurality voting rules, which are the default under current state corporate laws, the directors 
with the most votes win, even though less than a majority of the shareholders have voted. Under a majority rule, 
in contrast, ―withheld‖ votes are in effect votes against the candidate, which weakens management control over 
election outcomes. Most Fortune 500 firms have now adopted some form of majority voting. See Anabtawi & 
Stout, supra note 17, at 1283 & n.106 (citing a 2007 report on such policies). 
 34. See 2009 Proxy Scorecard, supra note 32. 
 35. At the time of this writing, the SEC proxy access rules enacted under the authority of the Dodd-Frank 
Reform Act are the subject of litigation filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable 
and pending in the D.C. Circuit. Business Roundtable v. SEC, D.C. Cir., No. 10-1305 (Sept. 29, 2010). For 
academic arguments against expanded shareholder power that resonate in the ongoing debates, see Lynn A. 
Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights]; Martin Lipton & 
Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 67 (2003). 
 36. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 37. Id. §§ 951 (―say on pay‖), 953 (executive compensation disclosures), 957 (limitations on broker 
voting). 
 38. On July 1, 2009, the SEC approved changes to the New York Stock Exchange‘s Rule 452 to require 
brokers to receive specific voting instructions from their clients before voting those shares in uncontested 
director elections. Since investor silence no longer means ―yes,‖ this change makes automatic confirmation of 
directors less assured and may give shareholders greater leverage with management. Order Approving Proposed 
Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-60215 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. 
See also Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
229, 239, 240, 249 & 274) (mandating enhanced risk management disclosure); Shareholder Approval of 
Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, 75 Fed. Reg. 2,789 (Jan. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 240) (requiring companies that received Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds to permit shareholder 
advisory votes on executive compensation). 
 39. Dodd–Frank Act, § 971(a)–(b). 
 40. Exchange Act Rule 14a-11—the final SEC proxy access rule—limits these rights to certain 
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they authorize shareholder proposals seeking charter or bylaw amendments related to 
shareholder director nominations.41 At the time of this writing, the SEC is conducting a 
comprehensive review of the U.S. proxy system to improve its efficiency and 
transparency. This process may well result in further rule-making efforts to facilitate 
shareholder notice and access to the corporate proxy.42 
In sum, shareholder activism itself, changing market conditions, and regulatory 
changes have ushered in a new shareholder-oriented world for public corporations in 
which more investors are able and willing to take a greater role in shaping corporate 
decision-making and where corporations are more likely to take notice. However, 
whether this is a good thing for American corporations, their shareholders, and society as 
a whole depends in large part on how shareholders use their power. For some critics of 
shareholder democracy, the answer to these questions depends to at least some degree on 
whether shareholder voice benefits stakeholders. 
B. The Problem of Stakeholders 
Concerns about stakeholders have been raised from all sides of the shareholder 
empowerment debate. The basic objection to greater shareholder control raised by 
Stephen Bainbridge and other director primacy proponents is that the heterogeneity of 
stakeholder and shareholder interests makes centralized decision-making by the board of 
directors more, not less, essential to efficient management of the firm. 43  Expanding 
shareholder influence over corporate decision-making and decision-makers is suboptimal, 
then, because it is likely to undermine board discretion.  
More strident critics of shareholder democracy fear that shareholder advocacy of 
stakeholder interests will balkanize boards, producing de facto ―constituency directors‖ 
who speak for the interests of certain shareholders or stakeholders rather than for 
shareholders as a class.44 With directors accountable to everyone, they would become 
accountable to no one. 45  At the very least, it is argued, shareholder advocacy of 
stakeholder interests and other ―private‖ concerns will distract corporate managers from 
their duty to maximize shareholder wealth. This view was voiced most strongly perhaps 
 
shareholders holding at least 3% of the outstanding voting shares for at least three years prior to its exercise of 
nominating rights. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml. The number of shareholder 
nominees is also limited. Id. at 56,674–76 (summarizing the requirements). The final rule amends Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-8 to permit shareholders to submit proposals related to director election and nomination procedures. 
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (2010). These rules at the federal level extend beyond recently enacted amendments to 
Delaware‘s corporate code that permit companies to adopt bylaws giving shareholders proxy access at the 
corporation's expense. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112–13 (2009). See also Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, supra, at 4.6671–72, 56.678–79 (explaining why the final rules reject an ―opt-in‖ approach that 
would require companies to elect proxy access via bylaw amendment under state law). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010).  
 43. See generally Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 35. 
 44. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 35. 
 45. See infra notes 237–38 and accompanying text. The arguments for and against multi-stakeholder 
fiduciary duties and other rules that would give nonshareholders direct voice in corporate affairs are the subject 
of a vast literature beyond the scope of this Article. For responses in the context of the shareholder democracy 
debate, see Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 608–15. 
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by Henry Manne, Dean Emeritus of the George Mason School of Law, in an op-ed on the 
dangers of shareholder proxy access, where he argued that ―the laws of corporate 
governance should not countenance interference by those activists‖ who put ―social 
causes, political movements or the reallocation of wealth‖ above profit maximization 
with the ―contractually established expectations of the vast number of investors‖ who 
―are interested exclusively in maximizing their return on investment.‖46 To the extent 
institutional investors might use their influence to advance ―personal or political agendas 
ahead of the [economic] interests of [their funds] beneficiaries,‖ director control becomes 
even more essential to preserving the economic value of the firm and avoiding costly 
wrangling over competing and potentially value-reducing investor priorities. 47  In 
essence, too much attention to stakeholder interests is wealth-reducing and is therefore 
bad for the firm and bad for shareholders.  
Other skeptics of greater shareholder power affirm the importance of attention to 
stakeholders but observe that corporate directors and officers are already well-positioned 
to attend to stakeholders under existing law.48 Thus, there is less need for shareholders to 
advocate for stakeholders. Management insulation from shareholder control, it is argued, 
is in fact favorable to stakeholders in that it ―ties the hands‖ of shareholders ex ante to 
encourage stakeholders to make firm-specific investments without fear that shareholders 
will transfer value from the firm ex post.49 These benefits may be lost if shareholders 
gain real control over management. This view also resonates with progressive corporate 
law scholars, such as Lawrence Mitchell, who see board control as a better safeguard of 
firm interests as a whole, and who fear that shareholder pressure for higher profits will 
keep management from giving proper attention to employees and other corporate 
stakeholders. 50  In short, shareholder empowerment might actually exacerbate market 
pressures toward single-minded profit generation, at the expense of stakeholder interests.  
Other scholars note more pernicious dangers. They contend that powerful investors 
will use their power to exact concessions from other corporate constituencies (the 
―holdup‖ problem), siphon off firm value toward opportunistic shareholders or 
shareholder coalitions (―rent-seeking‖), or align with management to the detriment of 
nonshareholders (―co-optation‖ or ―gang up‖).51  These concerns echo criticisms first 
 
 46. Henry G. Manne, The “Corporate Democracy” Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at A23. 
 47. See Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 35, at n.89. See also Lipton & 
Rosenblum, supra note 35, at 82–85 (arguing that greater shareholder involvement will bog down the 
corporation in inefficient, value-reducing negotiations with various shareholder groups). 
 48. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 253 (arguing that ―boards exist . . . to protect the enterprise-
specific investments of all the members of the corporate ―team,‖ including shareholders, managers, rank and 
file employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors‖). Lynn Stout suggests in her later work that she 
has no objection to shareholder advocacy of stakeholder interests, so long as it is not driven by an economic 
conflict of interest. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 17, at 1284 (explaining that directors are free to consider 
the interests of multiple stakeholders). 
 49. Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 304–05. See also Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 579 
(arguing that ―directors and shareholders would strike a bargain [in advance] in which directors pursue 
shareholder wealth maximization‖ but that such an approach ―often redounds to the benefit of nonshareholder 
constituencies‖). 
 50. See, e.g., Lawrence Mitchell, The Board as a Path to Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 207, 283 (Doreen McBarnet et al., eds. 2007). 
 51. See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming October 
2010) (detailing the costs of activism by heterogeneous shareholders); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of 
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raised in the 1990s about public pension funds‘ susceptibility to political capture by 
―special interests‖ and the potential for their influence to be used to the detriment of other 
shareholders and of the corporation.52  
Assessing the strength of these competing concerns will require further empirical 
investigation as the regulatory changes reviewed above are implemented. In the 
meantime, it is clear that claims about the merits and limits of shareholder empowerment 
are entwined with the question of the proper space for stakeholders in corporate decision-
making. Largely overlooked in these debates, however, is the possibility that shareholders 
may define their own long-term economic interests in terms of stakeholders. The 
―enlightened shareholder value‖ vision of the corporation described in Part IV is one such 
approach. It is also one which suggests new responses to some of the concerns 
surrounding shareholder power. Before considering this alternative vision and evidence 
of its emergence, this Article lays a foundation for that discussion by reviewing the 
position of stakeholders under prevailing corporate law rules.  
III. STAKEHOLDERS UNDER CORPORATE LAW 
Over the course of the past century, the famous debate between Adolph Berle and 
Merrick Dodd in the Harvard Law Review over the nature and purpose of the corporation 
has been traced and retraced in a pendulum swing between two fundamental positions. 
First is the shareholder-oriented view, that the corporation is formed from the nexus of 
private contracts (or is, alternatively, a private entity) whose primary purpose is to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Second is the stakeholder view, that the corporation has 
both public and private roles and must therefore be managed in the interests of a broader 
range of stakeholders, including employees, consumers, and even the public at large.53 
 
Shareholder Influence, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 129, 129 (2009) (arguing that ―shareholder oligarchy‖ creates 
greater risks of shareholder ―holdup‖ of employees and other nonshareholder groups, even as it creates better 
conditions for shareholder engagement); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 575–77, 589–90 (2006) (highlighting the dangers of rent-seeking behavior and 
shareholder empowerment in light of shareholders‘ heterogenous non-economic interests); Anabtawi & Stout, 
supra note 17, at 1261 (stating that trends in shareholder activism ―point to an inevitable increase in the risk of 
shareholder opportunism‖); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 35, at 67 (―[T]here is serious doubt as to whether 
institutional shareholders, public pension funds, and labor unions—the parties most likely [to engage in 
shareholder activism]—are well-suited to [monitor directors]‖ because each ―has duties to its own 
constituencies [and] its own agenda.‖); Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 39, 62–63 (2000) (stressing the threat to organized labor posed by alliances between management and 
powerful institutional shareholders). 
 52. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (finding that ―public pension funds face distinctive investment conflicts that limit 
the benefits of their activism‖). As of March, 2011, new regulations issued by the SEC will prohibit ―pay to 
play‖ practices by investment advisers in order to curtail efforts to win public pension fund business through 
political contributions. Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,018 (July 14, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). The new rules should address the primary concerns raised about 
public pension fund conflicts of interest. Id. 
 53. Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1060–69 (1931); Merrick 
Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153–57 (1932). Berle 
emphasized the fiduciary duties of managers toward shareholder-beneficiaries, while Dodd argued for broader 
obligations to a wider set of constituencies, including employees, consumers, and the public at large. As has 
been frequently observed, their positions diverged largely because of what they saw as the core problems 
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Corporate law in most of the rest of the world follows a stakeholder approach,54 while 
dominant understandings of the corporation‘s role and purpose in the United States 
remain decidedly shareholder-oriented.55 
The ―standard shareholder-oriented model‖ of the corporation has generally been 
viewed to encompass essentially three elements: (i) the view that the corporate objective 
is to maximize shareholder wealth, as measured by the market value of the corporation‘s 
shares; (ii) the principle that control over the corporation lies ultimately with 
shareholders; and (iii) the principle that shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of 
judicially enforceable fiduciary duties owed by management and of special monitoring 
rights, such as voting rights and the right to bring derivative actions, that are generally 
not afforded to other corporate constituencies.56  
The first element, the shareholder wealth maximization norm, establishes both the 
―ends‖ of corporate decision-making and the decision-making rule for corporate 
managers (i.e., the ―means‖)—namely, that managers advance the best interests of the 
corporation by acting exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders.57 The second 
and third principles address the balance of power between shareholders and management, 
and between shareholders and stakeholders, respectively. Scholarly positions on these 
dimensions can be traced along the axes introduced by Bainbridge, as shown below.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
confronting corporate law. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating 
Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2004) (explaining power 
dynamics between society and corporations). Berle was most concerned with agency problems resulting from 
the separation of ownership and control, while Dodd worried about the effects of unrestrained corporate power 
on nonshareholders. Id. at 34–35. 
 54. See, e.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for 
Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 5 (2000) (explaining the effects of globalization on corporate 
governance). 
 55. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 53, at 32 (referring to shareholder primacy as the ―macro script 
of corporate law‖); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function, 14 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8, 8–9 (2001) (hailing the strong support for the shareholder primacy norm in 
―200 years of research in economics and finance‖). For a history of shareholder primacy, see D. Gordon Smith, 
The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (explaining shareholder primacy norm and its 
limited application to ordinary business decisions). 
 56. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 440–43; Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 
573–74 (focusing on ―the shareholder wealth maximization norm, . . . and the principle of ultimate shareholder 
control‖ but addressing the third principle, that shareholders are the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties and 
monitoring rights). 
 57. The classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., which endorsed this proposition, states:  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders . . . . 
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits 
. . . in order to devote them to other purposes. 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 58. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 547–48. 
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Figure 1: The ―Means‖ and ―Ends‖ of Corporate Governance59 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1, the vertical axis represents the range of positions with regard to the 
corporate purpose (the ―ends‖), and the horizontal axis represents views on the proper 
center of corporate decision-making power (the ―means‖). It should be noted that some 
ambiguity surrounds use of the term ―shareholder primacy,‖ which can refer to both the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm (the vertical axis) and to the view that the balance 
of power in corporate governance should be set in favor of greater shareholder control 
(the horizontal axis). 60  Interestingly, with only limited exceptions, neither aspect of 
shareholder primacy is in fact mandated by corporate law.  
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Despite the divergent uses of the term ―shareholder primacy,‖ it is most often 
equated simply with the view that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize 
shareholder wealth. In the oft-quoted words of Milton Friedman, ―there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business—to . . . increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud.‖ 61  By establishing the ―ends‖ of corporate decision-making, the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm also sets a decision-making rule for corporate 
managers—namely that the best interests of the corporation are advanced when managers 
act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders. Under shareholder primacy in 
its strongest form, attention to nonshareholders, corporate philanthropy, or any other 
―socially responsible‖ activity that is profit-reducing is generally impermissible, because 
such activities necessarily impair the company‘s ability to achieve maximum shareholder 
profits. To the extent that these activities generate profits, at least in the long run, they are 
simply good business, nothing more.62 
 
 59. See id. at 547–48. 
 60. For a more complete treatment of shareholder primacy and its rationales, see generally Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership 
Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Smith, supra note 55; Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). 
 61. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). See also Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126. 
 62. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 135 (stating that charitable contributions and other expenditures on 
―socially responsible‖ conduct are justified as a matter of corporate self-interest and should not be ―cloaked‖ in 
the guise of social responsibility). 
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This is not to say that stakeholders have no place in a shareholder primacy world. 
Indeed, as Jill Fisch notes, ―both Berle and Dodd distinguished the legal obligations of 
managers to shareholders from their obligations to other stakeholders but, at the same 
time, acknowledged the legitimacy of other stakeholder interests.‖63 Under the standard 
law and economics argument, the surest way to produce the greatest aggregate social 
welfare is to ―make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, 
at least in direct terms, only to those interests.‖64 By focusing squarely on shareholder 
wealth maximization, businesses can best contribute to the public good by paying taxes, 
hiring employees, and providing goods and services.65  
In addition, law is part of Friedman‘s ―rules of the game‖ within which firms 
operate and which constrain the corporation‘s freedom to pursue profit maximization.66 
Thus, it is generally argued that stakeholder interests matter very much, but are 
adequately (and best) protected and advanced outside of corporate law by separate bodies 
of regulation, such as labor, environmental, or consumer protection regulations, and by 
explicit private contracts, which are the proper tools to address social welfare, equity, and 
distributional concerns.67 
However, it is generally acknowledged that shareholder wealth maximization is 
itself a norm of corporate behavior, rather than a legal tenet.68 Indeed, neither case law 
nor corporate statutes impose on directors and officers an obligation to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Even in Delaware, whose corporate code is less receptive to 
stakeholder interests than many other state corporate statutes, there is no requirement that 
management decision-making maximize shareholder wealth or even be justified solely in 
terms of shareholder interests. 69  Moreover, as interpreted by the Delaware courts, 
directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to act ―in the best interests of the company,‖ 
not solely in the interests of shareholders.70 Accordingly, courts will not second-guess 
 
 63. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 637, 648 (2006).  
 64. Hansmaan & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 441. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 133–34. 
 65. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 441 (operating the corporate enterprise to benefit the 
whole). 
 66. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61. 
 67. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 68. See Fisch, supra note 63, at 650 (noting that ―commentators widely recognize that shareholder 
primacy functions more as a norm than an enforceable legal rule‖). See also Smith, supra note 55, at 278 n.1. 
The Delaware Chancery Court stated in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) that 
―[i]t is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation's stockholders,‖ but later rulings have rejected this view. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1145, 1155 (Del. 1990) (holding squarely that the board is under no duty to 
maximize short-term shareholder value and emphasizing the board‘s duty is to act in the corporation’s best 
interest and to select the appropriate timeframe for consideration). 
 69. See Fisch, supra note 63, at 652 (observing that Delaware's corporate statute is noticeably silent ―both 
with respect to the standard by which board decisions are to be evaluated, and with respect to the stakeholders 
whose interests may legitimately be taken into account‖); Id. at n.88. 
 70. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). Other cases articulate this duty as one owed to ―the corporation and its 
shareholders,‖ though not to ―shareholders‖ alone. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 
1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713, n.54 (Del. 2009). The dominant 
view among corporate scholars is that little should be read into the emphasis on the interests of the 
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directors‘ ―business judgment‖ that is based on concerns about employees, communities, 
and other non-shareholder constituencies, absent any finding of a clear breach of 
fiduciary duty. 71  In fact, the broad discretion afforded directors under the business 
judgment rule applies even to profit-sacrificing decisions that benefit nonshareholders.72  
To be sure, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon held that there is a narrow range 
of cases where the board is required to maximize share price to the exclusion of all other 
criteria or interests. Specifically, ―concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate 
when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to 
protect or maintain the corporate enterprise, but to sell it to the highest bidder.‖ 73 
However, in Paramount v. Time Warner, the court subsequently limited Revlon to the 
narrow circumstance of that case, that is, where the board has decided to put the company 
up for sale. Outside of Revlon mode, ―a board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty 
to maximize shareholder value,‖74 and directors are expressly permitted to consider the 
interests of ―creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally.‖75 Thus, even in the hostile takeover context directors may reject shareholder-
wealth-maximizing bids in the interests of stakeholders so long as the decision can pass 
muster under a heightened change of control standard of review.76 
Beyond the general affirmations of director discretion outlined above, other aspects 
of current corporate law expressly permit decision-makers to preference stakeholder 
interests over shareholder wealth maximization. For example, the majority of states 
(Delaware not included) have adopted constituency statutes, which allow directors to 
consider the impact of corporate decisions on a broad range of stakeholders—not just on 
shareholders—and permit decisions ―in the best interests of the corporation‖ even if they 
are not justified on the basis of shareholders‘ economic interests. 77  State corporate 
statutes also uniformly authorize corporations to make charitable contributions without 
 
―corporation‖ as independent from the interests of shareholders, since courts have assumed that the two are 
synonymous and since any distinction improperly ―reifies‖ the corporation as an independent identity. See 
Smith, supra note 55, at 285 n.32. 
 71. The exercise of discretion by corporate management is further shielded by standard charter provisions 
that exculpate or indemnify directors and officers for breach of the duty of care. See generally Smith, supra note 
55 (arguing that because of the expansive scope of the business judgment rule, the true role of shareholder 
primacy in corporate law has been highly over-rated). 
 72. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–
76 (2005). The leading case on profit-sacrificing decisions is Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1968), where the court upheld the directors‘ decision to permit only daytime use of the stadium, which 
favored community interests at the expense of shareholder profits. 
 73. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 74. Paramount Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) (upholding board rejection 
of takeover offer that was based on a desire to protect Time‘s corporate culture). 
 75. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 76. See id. Unocal introduced an intermediate standard of review in change of control transactions, 
requiring the board to show that their defensive action was a proportionate response to a reasonably perceived 
threat to the corporation. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2010). These statutes were adopted in response to the hostile 
takeover wave of the 1980s and early 1990s. In practice, courts have relied on them only rarely since the 
business judgment rule and other anti-takeover statutes already protect directors who reject takeover bids out of 
concern for other stakeholders. Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee 
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1231–32 (2004). 
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any showing that the contribution will improve profitability.78 
B. Control of the Firm 
With regard to control rights in the firm (the horizontal axis), American corporate 
law rules are in fact predominantly director-centric. As then-Chancellor Allen once put it, 
the law ―seems to have ringingly endorsed a managerialist or entity orientation,‖ rather 
than shareholder-centric control rules.79 Indeed, both the Model Business Corporation 
Act and the corporate code in Delaware, the jurisdiction of choice for most publicly 
traded companies incorporated in the United States, confer upon the board of directors 
the authority and responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.80 
The expanse of the business judgment rule makes this authority quite broad.81  
These director-centric rules are in fact quite compatible with a stakeholder 
orientation, as Professors Blair and Stout have demonstrated in their work on a ―team 
production‖ theory of the firm, in which the public corporation depends upon the firm-
specific investments of numerous stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, 
creditors, and communities.82 In the team-production model, these diverse interests are 
mediated by the board of directors in order to maximize the value of the firm to all 
stakeholders.83 With recent trends expanding shareholder influence, American corporate 
governance appears to be moving toward a model of corporate control where influence 
over corporate decision-making is shared by shareholders and corporate boards. 
Nonetheless, the balance remains weighted toward director primacy and gives corporate 
directors wide latitude to consider, or even preference, the interests of nonshareholders. 
C. Shareholder Preeminence 
However, state corporate laws—as a rule—generally do not give nonshareholders 
any means of directly influencing corporate affairs, nor do they mandate management 
attention to stakeholder interests. In particular, the rights of shareholders to elect 
directors, vote on major corporate transactions, ratify interested transactions, submit 
 
 78. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1961) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(9) 
(2010), the Delaware authority for corporate charitable contributions, to be limited only by a reasonableness 
test). 
 79. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
261, 279 (1992). 
 80. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (4th ed. 2008) (―All corporate powers shall be exercised by or 
under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
shall be managed under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .‖ See also DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009) (―The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .‖). Lynn Stout also points out that the default rules giving greater 
discretion to directors also appear to be the initial rules preferred by investors themselves at the IPO stage. See 
Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on ―Shareholder Primacy 16 (Jan. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/ucla-sloan%20foundation%20conference/new%20thinking 
%20on%20shareholder%20primacy.pdf) (surveying the literature and calling the default rules and these 
findings on investor preferences the ―twin anomalies‖ of director primacy in U.S. law). 
 81. The broad scope of the business judgment rule continues to be reaffirmed by the courts. See, e.g., infra 
notes 173–74 and accompanying text (discussing In re Citigroup and In re Caremark). 
 82. See Blair & Stout, supra note 29. 
 83. See generally id. 
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proposals for inclusion in the corporate proxy, sue derivatively and benefit from court-
enforced director and officer fiduciary duties, are—with few exceptions—not extended to 
other corporate stakeholders. 84  Giving monitoring and enforcement power to 
shareholders makes corporate managers directly accountable only to shareholders, an 
arrangement deemed normatively optimal for reasons discussed further in Part V.85  
Still, the fact that shareholders alone are the primary beneficiaries of these rights 
need not be viewed as a legal requirement that management attend only to shareholders‘ 
(economic) interests. Even assuming that shareholders as a class will prioritize wealth 
maximization, corporate law may grant monitoring and oversight rights to shareholders 
because they are in the best position to oversee management for the benefit of the firm as 
a whole.86 Thus, established corporate governance structures that preference shareholders 
can be coherently explained from both a shareholder primacy and a stakeholder-oriented 
standpoint. 
IV. DEFINING AND DRIVING ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE: PATHWAYS BEYOND 
THE SHAREHOLDER–STAKEHOLDER DIVIDE 
As we have seen, cross-currents of the shareholder-stakeholder debate lie beneath 
some of the core objections surrounding increased shareholder power. We have also seen 
that corporate law does not prevent, and in fact expressly permits, directors and officers 
of public corporations to take the interests of nonshareholders into account. This Part 
introduces ―enlightened shareholder value‖ as an alternative vision of the corporate 
purpose and presents evidence that it is being embraced by a growing number of 
influential institutional investors. Part V draws on this foundation to assess enlightened 
shareholder value as a corporate decision rule and explore the response it offers to the 
stakeholder ―problems‖ that have animated much of the controversy over shareholder 
empowerment. 
A. Enlightened Shareholder Value Under the U.K. Companies Act 
American corporate law scholars and policy makers have not infrequently drawn 
inspiration from regulatory innovations in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the U.K. 
experience has served as a source for some of Lucian Bebchuk‘s recommendations in 
favor of increased shareholder voice. 87  This comparative approach has much to 
recommend it, since the United States and the U.K. share a common legal heritage and 
because their markets share important similarities—both have been historically 
 
 84. Progressive scholars have argued that there is insufficient justification to limit these preferential rights 
to shareholders. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41–71 (2006) (presenting 
justifications for the extension of monitoring and enforcement rights to workers); Mitchell, supra note 50. 
However, current Delaware case law does not recognize any fiduciary obligations to nonshareholders. Even 
when the corporation is approaching insolvency, creditors have standing to sue derivatively but are owed no 
direct fiduciary duties. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 
(Del. 2007). 
 85. See infra notes 213–14, 224 and accompanying text (discussing supporting rationales grounded in 
economic efficiency and contractual theories of the corporation).  
 86. See Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 312–14 (arguing that share price offers a proxy for firm value, 
albeit an imperfect one, on the assumption that shareholders will vote largely to maximize wealth). 
 87. See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 30, at 847–50. 
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characterized by a base of dispersed investors, in contrast to Japan and Europe, where 
family-owned companies and concentrated ownership structures dominated by banks and 
conglomerates predominate.88 Like the United States, corporate governance in the United 
Kingdom has historically been grounded on shareholder primacy. However, in 2006, 
when the United Kingdom enacted its new Companies Act, it took a small step in the 
direction of the European stakeholder model by introducing an ―enlightened shareholder 
value‖ paradigm of corporate governance that merges elements of the shareholder 
primacy and stakeholder models.89  
The core of the enlightened shareholder value principle is embodied in Section 172 
of the Companies Act, which defines the fiduciary duties of corporate directors as 
follows:  
[A] director . . . must act . . . in good faith . . . to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard 
to . . . the likely consequences of any decision in the long term; the interest of 
the company’s employees; the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others; the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment; the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and 
the need to act fairly as between members of the company.90 
As under prior law, shareholders monitor and enforce these duties through litigation.91 
The Act also requires listed companies to recognize and report on stakeholder 
matters as part of providing comprehensive disclosures to investors.92 Specifically, the 
mandatory directors‘ report, a business review of both financial and non-financial 
performance indicators, must include either information about the company‘s 
environmental impact, employees, social and community issues, and ―essential‖ 
contractual arrangements, or a statement detailing which type of information is not being 
provided.93 These disclosures are required unless the information is not ―necessary for an 
understanding of . . . the company‘s business.‖94 Per Section 417(2) of the Companies 
Act, this report explicitly intends to permit members to evaluate directors‘ compliance 
 
 88. See Jacoby, supra note 54, at 5 (surveying global corporate governance practice). 
 89. For the legislative history of the U.K. reforms, see generally, Gordon L. Clark & Eric R. W. Knight, 
Implications of the U.K. Companies Act 2006 for Institutional Investors and the Market for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 259 (2009); Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 495, 499–523. 
 90. U.K. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 172 (Eng.) [hereinafter U.K. Companies Act] (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at pt. 11 (providing for member (i.e., shareholder) litigation rights). The limited case law applying 
section 172 has simply confirmed that it is to be interpreted in accordance with existing common law rules, 
equitable principles, and existing laws that require directors to give priority to the interests of creditors in 
certain instances. Id. § 170. See Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, 
Enlightened Shareholder Value, and All That: Much Ado About Little?, 21–22 (Jan. 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 92. U.K. Companies Act, supra note 90, c. 46 § 417. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. § 417(2). These provisions represent a much watered-down version of the mandatory social 
reporting requirements that were initially introduced in the United Kingdom in 2005 for the largest public 
companies as the Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The OFR was later abolished and ultimately replaced 
by Section 417 of the Companies Act. For a description of the OFR, see Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 
516–22. For the Companies Act version, see generally Clark & Knight, supra note 89. 
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with their fiduciary duties under Section 172.95  
Nonetheless, under the Companies Act directors remain directly accountable only to 
shareholders. The Act maintains the (unitary) board of directors as the decision-making 
authority of the firm, with space for some degree of member (i.e., shareholder) control. It 
also rejects the European Union‘s approach to takeover law and labor issues, such as 
German codetermination or other requirements that labor be represented on corporate 
boards.96 Consistent with prior law, the Companies Act also places shareholders as the 
sole corporate constituency permitted to elect directors, bring a derivative suit, and 
authorize interested transactions.97  
The central elements of this ―enlightened shareholder value‖ model are (i) an 
explicit focus on long-term shareholder value as the goal of the corporation; (ii) a 
requirement that corporate directors and officers consider the effects of their decisions on 
―extended stakeholder constituencies,‖ financial and non-financial, that are referenced in 
Section 172; and (iii) a rejection of changes to the corporate decision-maker (i.e., the 
board with shareholder oversight) or the rules that give shareholders monitoring and 
enforcement rights not afforded to other stakeholders. To no small degree, then, 
―enlightened shareholder value‖ looks like the standard Anglo–American corporate 
governance model. As its name suggests it is grounded squarely within a shareholder-
primacy paradigm that emphasizes economic efficiency and returns on shareholder 
investments. It might also be argued that an ESV approach differs little from the current 
state of affairs under state nonshareholder constituency statutes, which permit corporate 
management to consider the interests of the various stakeholders contemplated by the 
U.K. Companies Act reforms.98  
But in contrast to both traditional shareholder primacy (and the approach of most 
constituency statutes), the U.K. reforms require boards to justify their decisions in terms 
of stakeholder interests and to disclose risks impacting stakeholders. By doing so, the 
United Kingdom endorses a multi-stakeholder decision-making rule and makes 
management at least indirectly accountable to stakeholders. In short, the goal of the U.K. 
approach is to ―maintain [corporations‘] financial accountability to a constituency of 
dispersed, independent shareholders while simultaneously using market forces to nudge 
companies in the direction of greater social responsibility.‖99 
To date, there has been no movement in the United States to follow the United 
Kingdom and mandate ―enlightened shareholder value‖ through state or federal corporate 
legislation. Indeed, there are many reasons why such a stakeholder-oriented regulatory 
shift is unlikely. First, of the states that enacted constituency statutes, only one makes 
consideration of stakeholder interests mandatory. 100  Key differences between the 
 
 95. U.K. Companies Act, supra note 90, c. 46 §§ 172, 417(2). 
 96. Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 550. 
 97. See, e.g., U.K. Companies Act, supra note 90, at arts. 188–223, 239 (listing the various interested 
transactions requiring member approval); U.K. Companies Act, supra note 90, at pt.11 (permitting derivative 
claims by members). 
 98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 99. Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 500 (emphasis added). 
 100. Connecticut is the sole state where consideration of stakeholder interests is mandatory. See CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2009) (corporations ―shall consider . . . (3) the interests of the corporation‘s 
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations‖). The literature 
defending and attacking constituency statutes is too vast to cite fully here. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, 
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dominant institutional investors in the United Kingdom (pension funds/insurers) and the 
United States (mutual funds), as well as the two countries‘ regulatory environments, 
make stakeholder-oriented corporate reform less likely in the United States.101 But given 
the strong and growing shareholder-orientation of the U.S. market, it is more likely that 
enlightened shareholder value will instead make inroads through shifts in the power and 
priorities of shareholders themselves.  
B. Investor-Driven Enlightened Shareholder Value 
More than two decades of scholarship has considered (and largely dismissed) the 
possibility that large institutional investors and other shareholders could drive greater 
corporate accountability to shareholders, much less bring about a new era of corporate 
social responsibility.102 However, the rise of shareholder democracy, the growing market 
power of institutional investors, and changes in the economic and regulatory climate all 
give cause for a second look. Indeed, as discussed below, many influential institutional 
investors now view attention to stakeholder concerns, such as environmental protection, 
labor and human rights, and related corporate governance reforms, as key to long-term 
financial gain. Interestingly, these developments come at a time when institutional 
investors are also well-positioned to bring an ESV vision into mainstream U.S. corporate 
practice.  
This subpart considers indicators of these trends, as well as the avenues through 
which these investors are seeking to advance greater stakeholder-orientation among 
investment intermediaries and in corporate practice. 103  The purpose here is not to 
demonstrate that shareholders are better positioned to advance stakeholder interests than, 
for example, boards or stakeholders themselves. Rather, the aim is to show first that 
investors are both able and willing to do so, and for reasons that are in fact quite 
conventional—the prospect of higher long-term returns and more comprehensive 
information on investment risks. 
1. Expressions of Enlightened Shareholder Value: ESG Risk Management & the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 
One of the most important expressions of an emerging enlightened shareholder 
value paradigm is growing attention to stakeholder issues as a critical element of firm and 
portfolio risk management. Much of the current energy in this direction focuses on 
developing tools to help firms, investors, and fund managers identify, measure, and 
 
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 971–96 (1992) (summarizing the 
literature). 
 101. See Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 529 (speculating that movements toward shareholder power 
might in future give rise to the phenomenon explored here—that shareholders might ―define shareholder value 
to include stakeholder concerns‖) (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 18–23 (regarding institutional 
investor characteristics). Although some of these gaps are narrowing, the British government remains much 
more strongly committed to advancing corporate social responsibility than U.S. state and federal governments; 
societal support for these goals is also arguably still stronger in the United Kingdom. 
 102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 103. Alternative terms have been suggested for what I refer to here as ―enlightened shareholder value.‖ See, 
e.g., Hess, supra note 12 (proposing sustainable ―long-term responsible investment‖ or simply ―LTRI,‖ and 
noting that no uniform terminology has yet emerged). 
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manage ―environmental, social, and governance‖ (ESG) risks in order to improve the 
quality of information available to investors and potentially increase overall portfolio 
returns and firm competitiveness.104  
The scope of ESG risks is not limited to ―environmental, social, and governance‖ 
measures, but extends to all ―extra-financial‖ fundamentals that can impact financial 
performance, such as climate change, corporate governance, employment standards, 
human resources, executive compensation, environmental impact, and reputational 
risk.105 Such issues are not typically reflected in standard accounting measures because 
they tend to be qualitative in nature and are related to externalities not well captured by 
standard accounting measures. ESG measures are also generally forward-looking and/or 
have effect largely in the medium- to long-term. Some ESG risks, particularly 
environmental risks, are increasingly material for many companies because they are the 
subject of public concern or are areas of heightened regulatory attention.106 Although the 
precise issues and measures that matter to particular investors or firms may vary, 
generally speaking, ESG investment strategies require investors, financial intermediaries, 
and corporate management to account for the effects of corporate operations on a wide 
range of nonshareholder constituencies.  
Among the broadest efforts to mobilize mainstream institutional investors around an 
ESG-oriented approach are the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI). The PRI was developed by the joint efforts of 20 leading institutional investors 
under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) and the United Nations Global Compact in 2006.107 Institutional investor 
signatories voluntarily commit to support and implement the following six core principles 
in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties toward their beneficiaries: (i) 
incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making; (ii) adopt an active 
ownership strategy and engage portfolio companies around ESG issues (iii) seek 
appropriate ESG disclosures from portfolio companies; (iv) promote acceptance and 
implementation of the PRI among service providers and others within the investment 
industry; (v) collaborate with other signatories to implement the PRI; and (vi) disclose to 
beneficiaries and the public how ESG issues are integrated within investment practices, 
policies toward service providers, and active ownership activities.108  
The primary goal of the PRI is to channel institutional investor power toward 
promoting the integration of ESG issues within internal investment practices, by financial 
intermediaries, and down the investment chain to portfolio companies.109 Secondarily, 
the PRI creates a framework for institutional investor accountability to industry peers and 
 
 104. ―Social risks‖ are risks arising from practices affecting the workforce, such as liability risk, or 
reputational risk associated from poor employment practices. 
 105. See, e.g., 2008 ESG Background Report, infra note 144 (describing scope of various ESG measures). 
 106. See, e.g., What are EFIs?, ENHANCED ANALYTICS INITIATIVE, http://www.enhanced-analytics.com 
(follow ―What is EAI?‖; then follow ―What are EFIs?‖) (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter ENHANCED 
ANALYTICS INITIATIVE, EFIs] (explaining Extra-Frinancial Issues (EFIs)). 
 107. The PRI initiative is governed by an elected Board of 11 representatives from asset owner signatory 
organizations and two representatives from the United Nations. The Secretariat reports to the PRI Board. See 
The Principles for Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, 
http://www.unpri.org/about/ (last visited July 21, 2010) [hereinafter, PRI]. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
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to the public for progress toward these goals. The PRI is significant because its intended 
scope is not limited to isolated issues, portfolio companies, or investors, but rather 
extends horizontally across the investment industry, vertically throughout the investment 
(and ultimately, supply) chain, and broadly across a range of corporate social 
responsibility and stakeholder concerns.  
2. The ESG Rationale 
Historically, stakeholder-oriented investment has been identified almost exclusively 
with ―socially responsible investment‖ (SRI) strategies that identify particular industries 
or firms to exclude from (or include in) an investment portfolio based on certain ethical 
or ―values-based‖ screens and may prioritize ethical, religious, social, and/or 
environmental concerns equally or above financial risk and return.110 Many institutional 
investors shy away from social screening because of regulatory diversification 
mandates,111 because of the perception that ethical or moral investment criteria cannot be 
adopted by fund fiduciaries,112  or because of the belief that a restrictive investment 
approach will result in systematically below-market returns and overall higher risk 
exposure.113 The limits of the screening model are among the key factors that have kept 
SRI from being embraced by the mainstream investment community and from having a 
deeper impact on corporate practice.114 
ESG-oriented investing and activism, however, is grounded on traditional economic 
rationales. The two primary rationales that together form the ―business case‖ for this form 
of ―responsible investment‖ are the prospect of higher long-term returns, and improved 
firm-level risk management and portfolio-level risk analysis. For example, the PRI 
affirms that a focus on ESG matters ―may better align investors with the broader 
objectives of society,‖ but its fundamental rationale is solidly grounded in shareholder 
primacy—namely, that ―consideration of [ESG] issues is part of delivering superior risk-
adjusted returns‖ to investors over the long run.115 Given the potentially controversial 
nature of an effort to define shareholder value explicitly with reference to stakeholders, it 
is important to unpack the relationship between ESG risk management and financial 
 
 110. This definition is adapted from Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder 
Activism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 250, 250 (Andrew Crane et al., 
eds., 2008). 
 111. For a survey of these limits, see id. at n. 30. 
 112. Many pension fund managers are of the view that ERISA‘s prudent investor standard requires a 
unitary focus on maximizing returns to beneficiaries and thus prevents them from basing investment decisions 
on ethical or other non-financial factors. See RONALD B. DAVIS, DEMOCRATIZING PENSION FUNDS: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 56–62 (2008) (discussing pension fund fiduciary duties). 
 113. There is some evidence that over the long term SRI screened funds may perform at least as well as 
(but not better than) unscreened peers; however, there is also some evidence based on SRI indices that SRI 
investments may not exhibit a lower risk profile than comparable non-SRI investments. See Kurtz, supra note 
110, at 269–71. 
 114. Even the term ―SRI‖ prompts a negative knee-jerk reaction from many mainstream institutional 
investors. See Hess, supra note 12, at 229–30 (citing survey results); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, 
Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2005) (citing interview results). 
 115. FAQs, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, http://www.unpri.org/faqs/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2010). 
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performance.  
a. Firm-Level Risk Management and Financial Performance 
Considering first the firm-level perspective, the rationale is that management failure 
to understand and respond to ESG risks can hurt the company‘s long-term financial 
performance, while monitoring ESG issues can help management identify such risks as 
well as new opportunities to generate long-term shareholder wealth.116 Reducing firm-
level risk can confer direct benefits on managers, employees, creditors, and other 
stakeholders who have made firm-specific investments in the company and thus have 
vested interests in the firm‘s survival. Better ESG risk management may also benefit the 
firm by lowering the cost of capital.117 If attention to ESG matters translates into a 
broader commitment to corporate social responsibility, it may also produce economic 
benefits by improving brand loyalty, employee retention and motivation, resource 
allocation, and overall competitive advantage.118 
A number of studies by the United Nations Environmental Programme Finance 
Initiative and other researchers testing these claims have found either a neutral effect or a 
positive correlation between ESG factors and corporate financial performance (CFP).119 
While further research is needed, these early results lend support to the substantial 
empirical literature finding, on balance, that there is weak but positive correlation 
between corporate social performance (CSP) and CFP.120  
 
 116. See, e.g., ENHANCED ANALYTICS INITIATIVE, EFIs, supra note 106 (stating that members of Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative, a collaboration between asset managers and ESG researchers, ―believe good management 
of extra-financial performance can reduce risk and may, in some circumstances, deliver added value‖). See also 
infra notes 119–20 (discussing the materiality of ESG measures to corporate financial performance). 
 117. See Mark Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, Environmental Risk Management and the Cost of Capital, 
29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 569 (2008) (presenting empirical evidence that environmental risk management 
reduces the cost of equity capital and allows firms to more easily obtain debt financing). 
 118. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive 
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 78 (Dec. 2006) (discussing the emergence 
of CSR as a priority for business leaders). 
 119. The UNEP Finance Initiative has published a series of reports on the materiality of ESG measures to 
equity pricing. See, e.g., The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance Issues to Equity 
Pricing, UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE (June 2004), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/ 
amwg_materiality_equity_pricing_report_2004.pdf; Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and 
Governance Issues to Company Value, UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE (2006), available at 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/show_me_the_money.pdf. 
 120. See David P. Baron et al., The Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance 4 (Stan. U. 
Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1993, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1202390 
(surveying the empirical literature). See also Marc Orlitzky, Corporate Social Performance and Financial 
Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(Andrew Crane et al., eds., 2008) (conducting a meta-analysis of the literature and concluding that ―there is a 
positive, but highly variable, relationship between [the two] and that they are mutually reinforcing and 
positively correlated). But see Amann et al., supra note 1, at 343–44 (concluding from a similar meta-analysis 
that ―numerous‖ empirical studies on the links between corporate social performance and corporate financial 
performance have been done ―without arriving at truly proven results one way or the other‖). 
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b. Portfolio-Level Risk Management and Financial Performance 
At the portfolio level, the argument that better ESG risk assessment will improve 
risk-adjusted returns across a portfolio is more complex. First, ESG risks can be either 
systematic (i.e., undiversifiable) risks affecting the market as a whole (measured by beta) 
or unsystematic, diversifiable risks that are firm-specific.121 Systematic risks include the 
risk of regulatory, socioeconomic, or political changes, such as a change in the rate of 
inflation or the gross national product (GNP). 122  Examples of firm-specific (i.e., 
diversifiable) risk, on the other hand, might include risk related to potential product 
liability claims or a change in corporate management. According to the standard capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), to the extent that investors are able to diversify away firm-
specific risk (even if they fail to do so), they are not compensated with a higher risk 
premium on the asset.123 Thus, there should be no economic gain to the investor from 
reducing firm-specific risk. 
However, modern portfolio theory offers an explanation for why large institutional 
investors might want to reduce even firm-specific risk—namely, that unique, firm-
specific risks, such as the risk created by poor environmental practices, are in fact 
internalized by the portfolio investor, since the cost of the harms, or negative 
externalities, produced by one portfolio firm may in fact be borne by other portfolio 
firms.124 These costs might arise directly—for example, if environmental harms impact 
real estate owned or insured by another entity in the portfolio—or may be indirect costs 
assessed against the economy as a whole—for example, higher tax rates imposed in a 
given locality to cover environmental cleanup.125 Therefore, highly diversified investors 
have a direct incentive to seek more comprehensive information on the externalities 
produced by portfolio firms and to respond to such information through exit or 
engagement. 
Moreover, some highly diversified investors, including ESG‘s main proponents, are 
so-called ―universal owners,‖ a term which refers to public and private pension funds, 
mutual funds, labor union funds and other large institutional investors that are diversified 
to the point that they are in essence invested across the entire economy.126 Because of the 
breadth of their holdings, such investors have particular incentives to attend to the long-
term health of the broader economy.127 They may also be more predisposed to take into 
account issues, such as the environment, labor practices, health care, and anti-competitive 
behavior, that impact entire industries and the economy as a whole.128  
 
 121. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 347–48 (9th ed. 2010). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 347–61. 
 124. See HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 5–18, 98–99 (noting that such investors will for similar 
reasons have interest in encouraging firms to produce positive externalities, such as through research and 
development). 
 125. These examples are drawn from HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 4–5. 
 126. According to Hawley and Williams, a ―universal owner‖ is ―an institutional owner whose holdings are 
highly diversified and, typically, held long term,‖ such that they essentially represent a cross-section of the 
entire economy. Id. at 3. 
 127. See id. at 3–18; ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 262–63 (1996). 
 128. Id.  
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One of the most important reasons why prominent institutional investors and 
financial intermediaries are behind much of the movement to account for ESG risks is 
that more comprehensive information regarding firm-level ESG risks might increase the 
quantity and quality of non-financial information available to the markets and better 
enable diversified owners to more accurately structure their portfolios in accordance with 
their risk preferences. Institutional investors rely strongly on the information reflected in 
market prices and on financial agents‘ responses to those prices.129 If, as is now widely 
recognized, there are limits to market efficiency,130 then the market may only imperfectly 
account for risk.  
Moreover since comparable, verifiable information related to certain stakeholder 
interests—such as environmental and social matters—is essential if markets are to 
accurately evaluate firms‘ market prices, its absence means that the entire market (and 
thus the investors‘ portfolio) is subject to systemic distortions. 131  If this is so, 
incorporating ESG factors into investment analysis may offer a way for investors to 
achieve higher risk-adjusted returns (measured by alpha)—that is, to ―beat the market‖ 
by exploiting these informational inefficiencies, at least until other investors trade on the 
same information and the market adjusts. Ultimately, the creation and dissemination of 
data on ESG and non-financial corporate performance measures should improve the 
efficiency and accuracy of pricing signals in the market as a whole, although again 
reducing the likelihood of unique gains to ESG-informed investors. A corporation can 
realize these informational benefits even if the ultimate allocation of portfolio funds 
remains unchanged. 
As with firm-level analyses, empirical studies to date have generally found that 
incorporation of ESG measures into portfolio allocation decisions has either a neutral or 
positive effect on portfolio returns relative to standard benchmarks.132 These studies lend 
some support to the view that investors may reap financial rewards (i.e., alpha) relative to 
the market by being the ―first movers‖ investing with the benefit of ESG-related 
information.133 If borne out by further research, such findings may bolster the claim that 
 
 129. Clark & Knight, supra note 89, at 269. 
 130. Discussion of market efficiency and its limits are standard in any corporate finance textbook. See, e.g., 
ROSS ET AL., supra note 121, at 428–66. See also Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An 
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003) (exploring alternatives to the ECMH). 
 131. Clark & Knight, supra note 89, at 269. See also Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value 
Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices (June 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985735 (demonstrating that the stock 
market does not fully value certain intangibles, such as employee satisfaction). 
 132. See M. Scott Donald & Nicholas Taylor, Does “Sustainable” Investment Compromise the Fiduciary 
Duties of Superannuation Trustees?, 36 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 47 (2008) (presenting a meta-analysis of over 40 
academic studies on the integration of ESG factors and portfolio performance); U.N. Env‘t. Prog. Fin. Initiative, 
Asses Mgmt. Working Grp. & Mercer, Demystifying Responsible Investment Performance, U.N. ENV‘T. PROG. 
FIN. INITIATIVE (Oct. 2007), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Demystifying_Responsible_ 
Investment_Performance_01.pdf (reviewing 20 peer-reviewed academic studies of the effect of ESG factors on 
portfolio performance, half of which found a positive effect, seven a neutral effect, and three a negative effect); 
Jeroen Derwall et al., The Eco-Efficiency Premium Puzzle, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 51 (2005) (finding that 
portfolios invested in environmentally efficient firms from 1995 to 2003 produced higher returns than firms 
with poor environmental ratings). 
 133. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL INVEST. RESEARCH, Introducing GS SUSTAIN 6–10 (June 22, 
2007), available at www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/S1_GOLDMAN_Ling.pdf (finding no 
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inclusion of ESG measures in investment analysis is in line with the fiduciary duties of 
public pension funds and other major institutional investors. 
3. Implementation & Diffusion 
Despite the rise of shareholder empowerment, questions remain about whether 
public pension funds and other institutional investors will use their power to promote 
long-term ―responsible investing‖ or ESG-oriented investing strategies, and if so, whether 
their voices will outweigh counter-pressure from investors who do not share this view. 
Indeed, it is widely recognized that for much of the past decade, market pressures and the 
behavior of institutional investors themselves encouraged aggressive risk-taking and an 
over-emphasis on short-term profits.134 Past studies also suggest that given the reality of 
high portfolio turnover and the costs of activism, the vast majority of public pension 
funds and other institutional investors will remain rationally apathetic and leave the 
challenge of translating enlightened shareholder value into corporate practice in the hands 
of a relatively limited number of institutional activists. 135  Even if these barriers are 
overcome, ―enlightened‖ investor activism might simply create more sustainability ―talk‖ 
and less ―walk‖ among public companies.136 
However, for a new stakeholder-oriented norm to compete with traditional 
shareholder wealth maximization, it is not necessary that all market participants sign on, 
so long as market leaders (both investors and corporate management) have a shared 
interest in promoting change. Indeed, many of the successes of investor activism 
highlighted below are the result of a limited number of investors focusing their efforts on 
select targets, generally the largest, most visible public companies, in order to spur 
market-wide changes.137  As the following discussion shows, enlightened shareholder 
value principles are already being adopted by leading institutional investors and other 
 
correlation between ESG performance and stock market performance, but that incorporating ESG factors into 
long-term industry and returns-based analysis identified companies that outperformed relevant indices by 25% 
between 2005 and 2007 and outperformed peers by 75% over the same period). It should be noted that the 
findings were based on Goldman Sachs‘ proprietary ESG analytics. 
 134. See ASPEN INSTITUTE, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH 
TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/ 
default/files/content/docs/business%20and%20society%20program/overcome_short_state0909.pdf. Even public 
pension funds, those often viewed most likely to promote corporate accountability, fueled short-termism by 
shifting more holdings toward higher-risk, higher-return investments, such as private equity and hedge funds, 
and by compensating fund managers on the basis of short-term portfolio returns. See Hess, supra note 12, at 
245–46. See also Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can 
Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41 (2008) (proposing an alternative compensation 
structure based on approaches common in private equity investments). Investor short-termism may reduce 
incentives for firms to focus on stakeholders by, for example, reducing environmental degradation or funding 
worker health and safety programs, since the costs of such measures are incurred in the short term while the 
benefits (or the risks of failing to do so) are often material, if at all, only in the long term. 
 135. See, e.g., Choi & Fisch, supra note 17, at 317–20; Hess, supra note 12, at 240–44. See also 
Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 35, at 628–35 (questioning the ability and will of 
institutional investors to engage in activism).  
 136. See, e.g., Conley & Williams, supra note 114, at 36–38. But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than 
Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771 (2007) 
(emphasizing the force of rhetoric in shaping corporate behavior). 
 137. See Yermack, supra note 23, at 15; Buchanan et al., supra note 25, at 31. 
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mainstream financial institutions, many of whom have a history of active engagement 
with the firms they invest in.138  
a. Institutional Investors & Enlightened Shareholder Value 
At an initial level, investor adoption of an enlightened shareholder value approach 
can be seen from the UN PRI itself. As of the time of this writing, over 800 institutional 
investors, asset managers, and industry service providers representing $20 trillion in 
assets under management have signed onto the PRI.139 U.S. signatories now account for 
15% of all PRI signatories and include 20 public, private, and union pension funds, 
including CalPERS, CalSTRS, AFL–CIO funds, and Connecticut, Illinois, and New York 
state pension funds, as well as nearly 70 prominent asset managers, such as JP Morgan 
Asset Management and TIAA–CREF.140  
PRI signatories and other investors are also beginning to implement ESG principles 
in their investment practices.141 For example, CalPERS and other major public pension 
plans‘ investment guidelines already mandate consideration of certain ESG factors in 
addition to standard financial analysis. 142  While ESG practices have made slower 
headway among mainstream mutual funds, Vanguard, a leader in passively managed 
investments, recently adopted investment policies on the human rights practices of 
portfolio firms that may pave the way for other passively managed funds to incorporate 
ESG measures into standard investment analysis.143  
 
 138. Notwithstanding the public claims of ESV adopters to the contrary, the fact that many of the early 
ESV proponents are public and union pension funds may itself raise red flags for those concerned that activist 
investor ―enlightenment‖ simply reflects political pressure, conflicts of interest, and other value-reducing 
motivations. For a response to this important challenge, see infra Part V. 
 139. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST.  INITIATIVE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRI INITIATIVE 2009, 6 
(2009) [hereinafter PRI, ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.unpri.org/files/PRI%20Annual%20Report%2009.pdf; 
Signatories to the Principle for Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST., 
http://www.unpri.org/signatories/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). Email from Natalie Beinisch, PRI Academic 
Network Manager, to author (July 26, 2010, 08:20 CST) (on file with author) (providing updated figures for 
assets under management). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See generally PRI, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139; Report on Progress 2009, PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESPONSIBLE INVEST., 3 (2009), [hereinafter PRI, Report on Progress] http://www.unpri.org/files/ 
PRI%20Report%20on%20Progress%2009.pdf; Ivo Knoepfel & Gordon Hagart, Future Proof? Embedding 
Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues in Investment Markets: Outcomes of the Who Cares Wins 
Initiative 16, UN GLOBAL COMPACT (Jan. 2009), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/ 
8.1/who_cares_wins_29Jan09webversion.pdf (stating that the level of consciousness of ESG issues has 
improved but progress is uneven). 
 142. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST.  INITIATIVE, Responses to the 2009 PRI Reporting 
and Assessment Survey, http://www.unpri.org/report09 (providing feedback from numerous institutional 
investors, including CalPERS, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (CRPTF), and the Illinois State 
Board of Investments, specifically questions 5 through 26); See also Robert G. Eccles and Aldo Sesia, 
CalPERS’ Emerging Equity in the Markets Principle (Harvard Business School Organizational Behavior Unit, 
HBS Case No. 409–054), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1408570 (reporting on CalPERS‘ new 
investment policy, introduced in 2007, which ―allow[ed] CalPERS money managers to invest in companies that 
were financially attractive and competitively positioned provided their business practices were sound from an 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) perspective regardless of where they were located‖). 
 143. Alan Petrillo, A Win for Investors Against Genocide, RISKMETRICS GRP. (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/esg/2009/03/a-win-for-investors-against-genocide-vanguard-commits-to-human-
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Support for emerging conceptions of enlightened shareholder value is further 
amplified by its natural overlap with much of the SRI movement, which now accounts for 
more than 12% of all professionally managed investments in the United States, or $3.07 
trillion assets under management. 144  Although SRI and ESV-oriented investment 
strategies differ, social investors share enlightened shareholder value‘s emphasis on non-
financial risks and long-term returns.145 The list of PRI investment advisor signatories is 
indicative of this, as it includes both ―responsible investment‖ leaders like Domini Social 
Investments and mainstays of the financial services industry such as Bloomberg LP and 
Risk Metrics Group/ISS.146 
Financial intermediaries are also beginning to focus on ESG risk measures in 
making investment allocations. These changes are particularly important because the vast 
majority of institutional investors rely on external fund managers to make investment 
decisions and many also delegate proxy voting authority to fund managers.147 As of 
2008, public pension funds in New York, Connecticut, Maryland, and California already 
required managers to provide ESG disclosure and were including ESG matters in 
standards for fund manager evaluations.148 Recent analyst reports of the mutual fund 
industry also point to a growing recognition of ESG indicators as integral to identifying 
strong performers. One recent survey of 319 fund managers, only 23% of whom self-
identified as ―socially responsible investors,‖ found that 99% include ESG factors in their 
investment analysis and over 70% view ESG as a tool to identify investment 
opportunities as well as to manage risk.149 Mainstream financial institutions, such as 
Citigroup, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, and State Street Global Advisers are also contributing 
 
rights-disclosure.html. 
 144. As of the start of 2010, 12.2% of all professionally managed assets in the U.S., then valued at $3.07 
trillion, were engaged in some form of SRI or ESG-oriented investing, according to the Social Investment 
Forum, the U.S. trade association for SRI investment and research. SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM FOUNDATION, 
2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at 
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/. These figures include over 490 mutual fund products in the United 
States—with assets totaling $569 billion. Id. See also RISK METRICS GRP., 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT: 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING, 13–14 (May 2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/files/private/ 
2008_ESG_Sustainability_Report.pdf [hereinafter 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT] (reporting that this 
represents a growth in SRI assets of over 18%, compared to 3% for non-SRI managed assets). 
 145. Although most enlightened-shareholder-value investors do not rely on screening strategies, screening-
based SRI is compatible with enlightened shareholder value insofar as its ultimate objective is generating long-
term shareholder wealth. See Kurtz, supra note 110, at 249, 251–53 (noting that SRI is no longer solely the 
domain of religious orders and other altruistic or ―values-based‖ investors, but now includes ―value-seeking‖ 
investors as well). The primary difference is that ESV-oriented investors would not generally share some social 
investors‘ tolerance for investments that generate below-benchmark returns but are stronger on ethical 
measures. 
 146. See Signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST.  
INITIATIVE,  http://www.unpri.org/signatories/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
 147. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 17, at 324 (reporting that over 84% of assets of the pension funds 
surveyed were externally managed). 
 148. Hugh Wheelan, Investors Increase Demands for ESG on All Manager Hires, RESPONSIBLE INVESTOR 
(Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.responsible-investor.com/home/article/esg. 
 149. Danyelle Guyett, ESG Ratings of Fund Managers—a Step Closer Towards the Mainstreaming of ESG 
Integration, MERCER (July 4, 2008), http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.htm?idContent=1311535; 
Andrew Coen, New Approach to Social Investing Finds Favor, INVEST. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2009), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090201/REG/302019971. 
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to or endorsing research on ESG implementation and integration.150  
New analytical tools and investor advisory services, while in their early stages, are 
being developed to help investors and financial intermediaries overcome the practical 
obstacles to defining, quantifying, and tracking extra-financial factors, such as 
―sustainability,‖ a commitment to labor standards, or a positive human rights record, in a 
comparable and consistent manner.151 In the past two years, Fidelity Investments, Merrill 
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Bloomberg have begun to make ESG performance indicators 
and ratings available to clients as part of their research tools for listed companies.152 
What is most interesting about these tools is that they are being developed to reach 
mainstream investors, not simply those adopting screening or other traditional SRI 
strategies.  
The global economic crisis has also moved public opinion and public policy further 
in the direction of enlightened shareholder value by calling attention to the dangers of 
short-term investment strategies and encouraging a reassessment of the balance between 
risk taking and risk management.153 As a result, a number of public pension funds and 
other asset owners are beginning to review their compensation practices in order to better 
focus fund managers on long-term performance.154 Recently adopted SEC disclosure 
rules now encourage tighter board (and investor) monitoring of corporate risk 
 
 150. In addition to those named above, studies by the UNEP Finance Initiative have been endorsed or 
supported by ABN Amro, the Conference Board, Credit Suisse Group, the IFC, Innovest (now a part of 
RiskMetrics), UBS, and the World Bank Group, among others. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 119. 
 151. On efforts to standardize ESG metrics, see generally Steve Lydenberg et al., From Transparency to 
Performance: Industry-Based Sustainability Reporting on Key Issues (June 2010), available at 
http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/IRI_Transparency-to-Performance.pdf; Alexander 
Bassen & Ana Maria Masha Kovacs, Environmental, Social and Governance Key Performance Indicators from 
a Capital Market Perspective, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSETHIK [J. FOR BUS., 
ECON. & ETHICS], 182 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307091. Standards for verifying and 
reporting greenhouse gas emissions data have also emerged in connection with the Climate Registry and the 
Carbon Disclosure Project. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-9106, 75 Fed. Reg. 6292 (Feb. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 
241) [hereinafter Commission Guidance].  
 152. See Research Firm Details: RiskMetrics Group, FIDELITY.COM, http://research2.fidelity.com/fidelity/ 
research/reports/release2/ResearchFirmDetails.asp?page=KLDResearch.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2010) 
(describing ESG Composite Ratings available through RiskMetrics/Innovest‘s ―Intangible Value Assessment,‖ 
which offers investors quantitative ESG data based on measures developed by GRI and KLD); RiskMetrics’ 
Intangible Value Assessment, RISKMETRICS, http://www.riskmetrics.com/iva (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors & the United Nations Principles for 
Responsible Investment, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST.  INITIATIVE (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.unpri.org/files/Innovest_PRI_Services.pdf. See also Mindy S. Lubber, Companies Come Clean on 
Climate Change, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. June 3, 2009 available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ 
content/jun2009/tc2009063_019035.htm; Customers, ASSET4 (Oct. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.asset4.com/page456.html (detailing a customer list and testimonials for ASSET4, a leading ESG 
analytical provider). 
 153. See, e.g., Amendments to Regulation SHO of the Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232 (Mar. 10, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (placing limits on short selling). See also King & Spalding, Lead Director 
Network, VIEWPOINTS (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/publication/ 
LDN_ViewPoints_4.pdf (presenting views of leading directors of Fortune 500 companies on board oversight of 
risk management and the need to consider broader measures of risk). 
 154. See 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 144, at 14. On the problem of short-term-oriented 
fee structures, see ASPEN INST., supra note 134. 
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management functions at a time when many investors recognize the importance of 
broader measures of risk, including ESG risks, in evaluating long-term firm performance 
and in portfolio risk analysis.155  These developments suggest that the emergence of 
enlightened shareholder value and broader economic trends may be mutually reinforcing 
and may together contribute to a fundamental reassessment of what corporate 
accountability to shareholders requires. 
b. Translating Enlightened Shareholder Value to Firms 
For investor-driven enlightened shareholder value to impact corporate decision-
making, a broader vision of corporate accountability must ultimately be transmitted to 
corporate boards and managers. But what precisely is the mechanism by which this 
occurs? And if enlightened shareholder value is advanced through market forces rather 
than through regulatory mandate, to what extent, if at all, does it ―have teeth?‖  
At base, ESG-oriented investors influence firms by communicating that recognizing, 
reporting, and responding to ESG risks matters. This occurs as institutional investors use 
the tools of shareholder activism—primarily voting, utilizing shareholder proposals, and 
engaging directly with firms—to seek more comprehensive disclosure from portfolio 
firms on stakeholder impacts. Investors can also urge investment intermediaries to take 
this information into account when allocating investments and direct them to 
communicate to firms that investors are basing investment decisions in part on ESG 
measures.  
Disclosure requirements under U.S. federal securities regulations, including those 
under Regulation S-K156 and Regulation S-X,157  already mandate that firms disclose 
ESG risks or other information if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote or make an investment 
decision, or if it would alter the total mix of available information.158 For example, as the 
SEC reaffirmed in January 2010, the legislative, regulatory, business, market, and 
physical impacts of climate change are increasingly material to public companies and 
investors and must therefore be addressed in regular public filings.159 Strong mandatory 
sustainability reporting obligations strengthen the requirements that apply to foreign 
 
 155. See, e.g., Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Release Nos. 33-9089; 34-61175, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 
(Feb. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 244, 274) (discussing proxy disclosure 
requirements regarding board oversight of risk management). The Dodd–Frank Reform Act also requires risk 
committees to be established by publicly traded bank holding companies with more than $10 billion in assets 
and certain non-bank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429–
30 (2010). 
 156. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304–305 (1982). 
 157. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1985). 
 158. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–
32 (1988) (extending the TSC Industries standard to all actions under the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Uncertainty as to materiality should be ―resolved in favor of those the 
statute is designed to protect,‖ that is, investors. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448. 
 159. See Commission Guidance, supra note 151, at 6290–97 (identifying relevant regulations that should 
incorporate climate change disclosures, including in particular, Management‘s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A)). 
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investors with interests in U.S. firms160 and to some U.S. firms listed in the United 
Kingdom and Europe.161  
Investor advocacy of stakeholders also comes in the context of a resurgent corporate 
social responsibility movement that in both the United Kingdom and the United States 
has proven to be a powerful driver toward broader measures of accountability.162 Many 
corporations face market pressure from consumers, employees, and civil society to 
consider their impact on stakeholders.163 As a result, the vast majority of U.S. public 
corporations already voluntarily issue ―sustainability,‖ ―triple-bottom-line‖ (financial, 
social, and environmental), ESG, or annual reports describing their commitment to 
stakeholders, 164  generally based on indicators developed by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI).165 Many investment analysts see sustainability reporting in any of these 
forms as an important risk assessment tool.166  
However, investor demand is still critical to driving improved ESG reporting and 
performance. 167  ESG disclosures under the securities laws have on the whole been 
limited in quantity and scope, whether because these risks have not been identified by 
firms, because they have not previously been viewed to be material, or because firms 
generally adopt a conservative approach toward qualitative and forward-looking 
disclosures.168 Voluntary disclosures, while more widespread, are inherently selective 
and for many institutional investors are inadequate to ensure transparency, accountability, 
 
 160. For example, in 1999 the United Kingdom amended its pension regulations to require trustees of local 
public pension funds to disclose the extent to which ―social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken 
into account in the selection, retention, and realization of investments‖ as well as any policies concerning the 
exercise of voting rights associated with their investments. See Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 504 
(referencing the 1999 amendments to the U.K. Pensions Act of 1995). But see Clark & Knight, supra note 89, 
270–71 (2009) (finding that the 1999 regulations had little impact because the primary obligations fell on fund 
managers rather than on institutional investors themselves). 
 161. See supra note 89 (explaining U.K. requirements). See also Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 502–
10 (describing requirements in continental Europe). 
 162. See generally THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008 (special issue on corporate social responsibility). 
 163. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on 
Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675 (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate 
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1442–59 (2006) (describing these trends). See also GOLDMAN 
SACHS GLOBAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH, INTRODUCING GS SUSTAIN 22 (June 22, 2007), available at 
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/S1_GOLDMAN_Ling.pdf (reporting studies showing that 53% of 
U.S. consumers actively seek information on corporate social performance). 
 164. See generally Fairfax, supra note 163, at 691–94 (finding that over 50% of Fortune 50 companies 
produce sustainability reports and that nearly 90% of Fortune 500 companies‘ annual reports address 
stakeholder issues). See also Williams & Conley, supra note 7, at 496 (observing that the ―identification and 
disclosure of corporate information concerning social and environmental risks‖ is itself a prime indicator of pro-
stakeholder convergence). 
 165. See generally GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, www.globalreporting.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
For comparisons of widely used indicators and standards, see generally COOPER, supra note 3, at 32–42. 
 166. See supra note 163and accompanying text. See also 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 
144, at 21. 
 167. The PRI itself is intended to improve the level and quality of non-financial reporting, particularly 
under the UN Global Compact. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, www.unpri.org (last visited Sept. 
13, 2010); UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
 168. See, e.g., B.C. Inv. Mgmt. Corp. (Can.) et al. as Petitioners, Supplemental Petition for Interpretative 
Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, at 21–31, No. 4-547 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2009/petn4-547-supp.pdf (citing studies evidencing this point).  
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and comparability with respect to ESG issues.169 In the absence of legally mandated ESG 
disclosures investors are therefore increasingly engaging with companies to advance 
corporate governance reform that includes closer attention to ESG issues and increasingly 
vocal about the types of information they regard as material to their investment decisions. 
i. Litigation 
In the United Kingdom, Section 172 of the Companies Act is enforceable through 
shareholder litigation.170 However, early implementation experience there suggests that 
the anticipated flood of shareholder suits has not materialized. Rather, the primary effect 
of the law has been to urge companies to more carefully document their consideration of 
the impact of corporate decisions on stakeholders.171  
In the United States, litigation is not likely to be a significant means of promoting an 
enlightened shareholder value decision rule, with the possible exception of claims 
challenging inadequate or misleading disclosures under the securities laws. As in the 
United Kingdom, stakeholders that are not also shareholders would not have standing to 
initiate a lawsuit against a company for management failure to respond to ESG risks, and 
such a case would only be brought where significant financial losses resulted. 172 
However, the Delaware Court of Chancery‘s decision in In re Citigroup has reaffirmed 
the strength of the business judgment rule with respect to risk management, making clear 
that shareholder litigation alleging director failure to adequately oversee risk management 
 
 169. A potential critique of the claim that investment strategies incorporating ESG measures may benefit 
market efficiency and ―first mover‖ investors is that such information is in fact already publicly available, either 
through existing mandatory disclosures or through voluntary corporate disclosures. However, the success of an 
investor-driven enlightened shareholder value paradigm depends on quantifiable, verifiable, standardized, and 
comparable ESG metrics being incorporated into analytical models used by mainstream investors, analysts, and 
investment intermediaries, all efforts that are presently in their early stages. See supra note 151 (citing studies 
identifying and developing such metrics). Observers also note the limitations of existing disclosure regimes and 
have described the types of information that would facilitate expanded integration of ESG factors into 
investment analytics but are not uniformly available to the markets. See id. (describing limitations to said 
metrics). See also Commission Guidance, supra note 151, at 7–10 (describing level of current disclosures 
related to climate change); Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate 
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. L. REV. 115, 127–36 (2009) (arguing for an 
interactive, process- and discourse-based approach to corporate disclosure); Aaron Bernstein, Incorporating 
Labor and Human Rights Risk Into Investment Decisions (Harvard Law School Pensions and Capital 
Stewardship Project Occasional paper No. 2, Sept. 2008), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
programs/lwp/pensions/publications/occpapers/occasional_paper2.pdf (describing challenges to the integration 
of labor and human rights factors into ESG-based investment criteria and proposing solutions); Cynthia A. 
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1197, 1289–93, 1299–1311 (1999) (describing the limits of corporate social disclosures under the securities 
laws, including the problems of differential access and incomplete or noncomparable information). On the 
failure of markets to account for certain nonfinancial measures of corporate performance, see also supra note 
131. 
 170. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 260–69 (U.K.) (introducing a new derivative action exerciseable by 
members (i.e. shareholders)). 
 171. See Loughrey et al., supra note 7, at 96–101, 110–11. 
 172. See Keay, supra note 91, at 29–32 (suggesting how claims might arise under § 172). The claims 
arising from the Gulf of Mexico oil disaster against British Petroleum PLC offer an example of one type of 
context in which shareholder litigation precipitated by a failure to attend to such risks might arise.  
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or mitigate potentially high-impact risks will be unlikely to prevail there.173 The court 
held that Citigroup‘s directors and officers were not liable for a breach of the duty of 
oversight articulated in In re Caremark for allegedly failing to mitigate ―excessive‖ 
business risk that resulted in catastrophic losses to shareholders during the subprime 
mortgage crisis.174  
ii. Voting & Engagement 
Another option is for investors to simply divest from firms with poor ESG 
performance (i.e., the ―Wall Street Walk‖). However, exit will in most cases be 
―invisible‖ to the firm absent any other communications from the investor and may not be 
a viable option for many investors with large holdings. In contrast, the exercise of voting 
power and direct negotiation with management are increasingly powerful tools for 
investors to influence corporate practice.  
Investors have the power to vote for the election of directors (or withhold votes from 
candidates they disapprove of), initiate or support shareholder proposals, and—under 
―say on pay‖ voting measures now mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act—―comment‖ on 
executive compensation. Empirical studies indicate that even when unsuccessful, a strong 
vote for a shareholder proposal, or weak support for a management proposal or director 
nominee, often sparks changes in the board, management, or corporate practices in the 
aftermath of the vote.175 ESV-oriented investors can therefore leverage their support for 
director candidates, executive compensation, or governance measures in a way that 
rewards directors who are well-aligned with an enlightened shareholder value approach. 
Shareholders can also directly advocate for stakeholder interests through ―social 
activism,‖ that is, shareholder activism around labor, environmental, or human rights 
issues. To date, shareholder social proposals and related shareholder campaigns have 
tended to be ad hoc, issue-specific, and driven by ethically-motivated and interest group 
investors rather than by mainstream institutional investors. 176  Few have actually 
passed.177  
However, recent years have witnessed a growing level of shareholder (and proxy 
advisor) support for social or environmental proposals, approaching levels more typical 
of governance-related initiatives.178 Even some mutual funds, including those managed 
 
 173. In re Citigroup Inc. S‘holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 174. Id. at 121–31 (interpreting and applying the standard for oversight liability set forth in In re Caremark 
Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). Cf. Am. Int‘l Grp. Inc., Consol. Deriv. Litig., 965 A.2d 
763, 796–99 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding claim for Caremark failure of oversight supported at the pleadings stage). 
 175. See Yermack, supra note 23, at 6–8 (examining the impact of shareholder voting on boards and 
corporate strategy). 
 176. A prime example is the anti-apartheid divestment campaign surrounding the Sullivan Principles, which 
was the first major ―responsible investment‖ shareholder-driven movement. It lost momentum and dissolved 
once apartheid ended. See generally S. PRAKASH SETHI & OLIVER F. WILLIAMS, ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND 
ETHICAL VALUES IN GLOBAL BUSINESS: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CODES 
TODAY 127–246 (2000) (comparing anti-apartheid divestment campaigns to modern shareholder campaigns). 
More recent campaigns targeting investment in Burma and Sudan appear to have followed the same issue-
centric approach. 
 177. See 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 144 (reviewing empirical studies). For example, 
resolutions on human rights typically gain less than five percent support from shareholders. Id. 
 178. For example, investor support for proposals calling for companies to produce emissions reports or set 
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by TIAA–CREF, Charles Schwab, and Credit Suisse, are increasing their support for 
shareholder proposals on climate change.179 In addition, a large number of the social and 
environmental proposals submitted annually are withdrawn, which often indicates that 
management has been willing to adopt some portion of the action requested by 
shareholders.180 For example, the withdrawal of over two-thirds of shareholder proposals 
requesting corporate sustainability reporting seems to confirm that sustainability 
reporting is gaining acceptance among mainstream investors, advisors, financial analysts, 
and managers.181  
In October 2009, the SEC opened the door further to shareholder engagement 
around ESG issues by adopting a new policy that will allow more shareholder proposals 
pertaining directly to risk management or requiring a risk analysis to go forward.182 This 
policy allows investors to urge firms to focus on risks (both governance (G) and 
environmental/social (E/S)-related) previously disregarded by the firm but which 
investors consider material. In addition, the increasing convergence between the identity, 
goals, and strategies of corporate governance and social activism may give stakeholder 
issues increased prominence as a focus of mainstream investor engagement.183  
A final development that is contributing to the emergence of enlightened 
shareholder value are networks for coordinated investor (and NGO) engagement, often 
around an ESG or social responsibility mission. Coordination amplifies investor voice by 
facilitating direct information exchange, collaboration, and goal identification, much of 
which can now be done without falling afoul of the SEC rules for proxy solicitations.184 
 
emissions reduction targets averaged 32% investor support in 2008, with one receiving majority support for the 
first time in 2009. Social and environmental proposals received, on average, 14% of the shareholder vote, up 
from an average 10% support at 360 companies in 2005. RISKMETRICS GROUP, POSTSEASON REVIEW: SOCIAL 
PROPOSALS (2008), available at www.riskmetrics.com/governance_weekly/2008/154.html; RISKMETRICS 
GROUP, POSTSEASON REPORT (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/docs/2009-postseason-
report. ISS, a leading proxy advisor, generally recommends support of social proposals; RISKMETRICS GROUP, 
2010 SRI PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (Jan. 2010) available at 
www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG_2010_SRISummary.pdf. 
 179. One recent study reviewing the proxy votes of 74 mutual fund families, together representing $3.8 
trillion in assets under management, on shareholder-sponsored climate change resolutions from the 2004 to the 
2008 proxy season found that these and other major mutual funds are increasing their support for shareholder 
proposals on climate change. ROB BERRIDGE & JACKIE COOK, MUTUAL FUNDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
GROWING SUPPORT FOR SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS 2–3 (May 2009) available at www.ceres.org/ 
mutualfunds09. 
 180. 2008 ESG BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 144. The number of shareholder proposals urging 
boards to adopt voluntary corporate sustainability reporting has also risen in recent years. Id. at 3–4 (reporting 
such proposals have generally attracted over 25% shareholder support in recent years). 
 181. Id. (reporting that over two-thirds of such proposals were withdrawn without a vote in during the 2007 
and 2008 proxy season); RISKMETRICS GROUP, POSTSEASON REPORT (Oct. 2009), supra note 178, at 15–16 
(reporting similar results for environmental proposals during the 2009 proxy season).  
 182. SEC STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/interps/legal/ 
chslb14e.htm. 
 183. See generally Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT‘L. L. 452 (2008) (describing the intersections between corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility); Ann K. Buchholtz et al., Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 110, at 327 (surveying the 
literature). 
 184. The rules do not cover communications by investors that do not seek voting authority, and exclude 
announcements of how an investor intends to vote. See BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 528–29 (explaining 
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This reduces the collective action barriers and free rider problems of shareholder 
activism.  
The PRI itself is a prime example. Coordinated engagement under the PRI extends 
beyond traditional core corporate governance concerns to direct advocacy of stakeholder 
interests, including some beyond a strict environmental or social/labor focus.185 Other 
institutional investor collaborations include the Carbon Disclosure Project, an 
international coalition of institutional investors that pushes the largest global corporations 
to disclose their level of greenhouse gas emissions.186 Yet another, the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economics (CERES), has initiated the global Investor 
Network on Climate Risk (INCR), bringing together leading institutional investors, 
investment funds, and environmental public interest organizations.187 The SEC‘s recent 
guidance on climate change reporting is one example of the potential impact of such 
coalitions, as it was issued in response to requests from CERES and a number of public 
pension funds, among others.188 These global coordination mechanisms can be viewed as 
a type of ―meta-regulation,‖ leveraging participants‘ reputational interests to give ―teeth‖ 
to otherwise voluntary commitments and translate them down the investment chain to 
financial intermediaries and corporations.189 
V. SHAREHOLDER ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
This Article has thus far presented a basic descriptive claim: that an ―enlightened 
shareholder value‖ (ESV) perspective is emerging as an increasingly relevant paradigm 
for mainstream institutional investors and many U.S. public corporations. It has also 
examined the basic rationales advanced in support of enlightened shareholder value from 
the standpoint of institutional investors. 
These developments raise a number of fundamental questions that previous studies 
have not addressed. For example, what precisely does enlightened shareholder value 
mean in the U.S. context, and what might enlightened shareholder value offer as an 
 
the 1992 reforms to the SEC proxy solicitation rules). 
 185. For example, in 2008, a group of 52 PRI signatories, including several from the U.S., conducted a joint 
initiative to urge 9000 listed companies to commit to sustainable business practices and the principles of major 
international conventions under the United Nations Global Compact. Collective Engagements by PRI 
Signatories, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVEST., http://www.unpri.org/collaborations/#3 (last visited Sept. 
19, 2010). See also Press Release, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, Global Investors Issue US $4 
trillion Incentive for Sustainability, 1–2 (October 27, 2008), http://www.unpri.org/files/prfinalef2610.pdf 
(stating that U.S. signatories included CalPERS, the Calvert Group, NYCERS, and several private pension 
funds and foundations). 
 186. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
 187. COALITITON FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE ECONOMICS, http://www.ceres.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2010). 
 188. See Commission Guidance, supra note 151, at n.20 (acknowledging CERES‘ submission of study 
results regarding climate risk disclosure). For petition signatories, see, e.g., Supplemental Petition, supra note 
168, at 31–32. 
 189. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 
245–91 (2002) (defining ―meta-regulation‖ as ―the regulation of self-regulation‖). It should be noted that while 
some of the signatory engagements coordinated under the auspices of the PRI, including those identified at 
supra note 185, serve a ―meta-regulatory‖ role, not all can be so classified. Thanks to Natalie Beinisch, 
Academic Network Manager of the UNPRI, for her comments on this point. 
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alternative to shareholder wealth maximization? Or is enlightened shareholder value no 
more than shareholder wealth maximization in a new ―responsible‖ guise? If enlightened 
shareholder value in fact suggests an alternative vision of the corporate purpose, what 
does it mean as a standard for managerial decision-making, and how well does it fit 
within existing corporate governance rules?  
This Part offers an initial response to these questions by clarifying the contours of an 
investor-driven enlightened shareholder value paradigm. It then presents normative 
arguments in favor of an ESV model and considers how ESV addresses some of the 
questions surrounding shareholder empowerment and potential shareholder advocacy of 
stakeholders. 
A. Enlightened Shareholder Value: Revising the Corporate Objective Function 
As described in Part II, the standard shareholder primacy paradigm incorporates: (i) 
the view that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth; (ii) the 
principle that ultimate control of the corporation rests with shareholders; and (iii) the 
identification of shareholders as the corporate constituency that may exercise monitoring 
and oversight rights over corporate boards. As we have seen, investor-driven enlightened 
shareholder value has, as in the United Kingdom, not been directed toward transforming 
current corporate governance structures to make corporate boards directly accountable to 
nonshareholders. I will also show below that ESV does not mandate any shift in current 
corporate governance rules. Instead, ESV is at base a revision of the first element—the 
corporate objective function—that is, the standard against which ―success‖ of the 
corporate enterprise is measured.  
In altering only this first dimension, ESV is only a moderate step from the 
―standard‖ shareholder primacy paradigm. For reasons discussed below, it fits, perhaps 
paradoxically, even more comfortably within current corporate law, which is 
fundamentally director-centric and gives directors and officers broad discretion to take 
stakeholder interests into account. In addition, enlightened shareholder value suggests 
managerial decision rules that could reduce negative externalities as well as motivate 
innovation in directions that generate positive outcomes for shareholders and other 
corporate constituencies.  
1. The Enlightened Shareholder Value Alternative: Distilling Decision Rules 
From Part IV, we can readily identify a number of the defining elements of investor-
driven enlightened shareholder value. First and foremost, the expressions of investor-
driven ESV explored here are motivated by the view that stakeholder issues have an 
economic impact on firms‘ long-term profitability and risk profile and, therefore, on the 
long-term value of investor portfolios. Second, while ESV investors are only in some 
cases directly advancing the interests of stakeholders—for example through social 
activism—they are at least indirect advocates of stakeholders by emphasizing the 
importance of environmental, social, governance, and other extra-financial measures of 
corporate performance. Finally, this vision of ESV depends on market pressure from 
investors and affirms the priority of shareholder value in managerial decision-making. In 
short, investor-driven ESV shares with the U.K. approach a focus on generating long-
term shareholder wealth through investor and management attention to the firm‘s impact 
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on extended stakeholder constituencies.  
a. Enlightened Shareholder Value & Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
The conventional understanding of shareholder wealth maximization has always 
been that corporations should maximize long-term returns to shareholders. 190  Since 
enlightened shareholder value also sets long-term shareholder wealth as the fundamental 
standard for evaluating corporate success, then perhaps, as some have argued, 
enlightened shareholder value is no more than ―shareholder primacy with an ESG cherry 
on top.‖191 But is this in fact the case? 
First consider cases where shareholders‘ long-term interests are coextensive with 
stakeholder interests—for example, a decision to build an alternative energy plant that 
will generate jobs, clean energy, and profits. Similarly, in some sectors consumer demand 
for ―sustainable‖ business practices may reward companies who deliver with increased 
profitability and market share. In these cases, the economic impact on the firm of an ESV 
approach might well be the same or better than under a shareholder wealth maximization 
approach and might at the same time generate greater economic and intangible benefits to 
other firm constituencies. Likewise, if management is considering several courses of 
action with comparable expected financial benefits, but some options confer a greater net 
benefit on stakeholders, then an ESV decision rule would preference the latter, essentially 
encouraging the firm to produce positive externalities. In contrast, an analysis based on 
shareholder wealth maximization would not suggest a basis for selecting between two 
courses of action expected to be equally profitable.  
Under the more common scenario, management must make tradeoffs among 
competing constituencies. Customer demand for low prices, employee demand for secure 
employment and competitive compensation, and shareholder demand for market or 
above-market returns will often be at odds. In a pure profit-maximization approach, the 
only relatively clear constraints on managerial decision-making are limits explicitly 
imposed by law. While neither shareholder wealth maximization nor an ESV approach 
offers a hard and fast rule for quantifying and weighing competing interests and their 
respective costs and risks,192 an ESV approach makes ESG and stakeholder-related risks 
increasingly salient to corporate management as part of the decision calculus.  
Under the stakeholder salience model developed by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, the 
importance of a stakeholder group to management depends on its relative ―salience.‖ 
Mitchell et al. define ―salience‖ with reference to the stakeholder‘s power to produce 
desired outcomes, the legitimacy or appropriateness of their claims, and the urgency of 
the issue to the stakeholder.193 For example, if a firm is weighing whether to adopt new 
technologies to reduce pollutant emissions or to maintain a competitive edge by 
 
 190. See, e.g., Hansmaan & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 439 (describing the goal of the corporation, and of 
corporate law, as ―principally striv[ing] to increase long-term shareholder value‖) (emphasis added). 
 191. Branson, supra note 15. 
 192. Indeed, we might also question the assumption implicit in the examples here that the financial 
implications of any decision (i.e., ultimately, shareholder value) can be disaggregated from consideration of 
stakeholder issues to meaningfully compare the costs and benefits. 
 193. See Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining 
the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (1997) (proposing a theory of 
stakeholder salience). See also COOPER, supra note 3, at 39–41 (describing this work and related literature). 
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continuing to pollute—and if we assume further that the pollution level is within legal 
limits and there are no reasons beyond environmental benefits to install the new 
technologies—then a firm might rationally decide to do nothing. However, if investors 
are expressing concern about environmental impact or regulatory risks confronting the 
firm—or are demanding more comprehensive public reporting of such issues—their 
influence is likely to increase the perceived legitimacy and urgency of environmental and 
community concerns for the firm. By lending their ―power‖ to stakeholder concerns, 
investors‘ voices also increase the likelihood that the firm will respond.  
However, it is in the cases like the one above—where market forces pressure firms 
away from social responsibility—that the contrast between shareholder wealth 
maximization and enlightened shareholder value is clearest. These are cases where a 
course of action that maximizes profits imposes negative externalities on stakeholders—
for example, by disregarding human rights or paying minimal heed to environmental 
impact. If permitted by law, such decisions are fully compatible with a shareholder 
wealth maximization approach. Under an ESV decision rule, in contrast, the firm must 
assess the potential impact on stakeholders. If a course of action is optimal only when the 
costs to stakeholders are ignored, then it should not be taken or the firm must absorb the 
costs.194 Of course, in some cases absorbing these costs will likely have an impact on at 
least short-term profits or may prevent the firm from reaching the level of earnings it 
might otherwise have achieved. For example, adoption of a greenhouse gas mitigation 
strategy might require significant expenditures with benefits realized only in the long 
term, or a firm may elect not to undertake a potentially profitable investment in a country 
where it is unable to minimize the risk of human rights violations by its subsidiaries in a 
cost-effective manner.  
These examples demonstrate that while enlightened shareholder value is by 
definition focused on driving long-term corporate profitability, it is not in all cases 
strictly wealth-maximizing. Part V.A.1.b below articulates a number of justifications in 
favor of the ESV decision rules presented here, including those that are to some degree 
profit-sacrificing. Einer Elhauge has also presented strong arguments supporting 
managerial discretion to sacrifice profits in cases such as these on both efficiency and 
ethical grounds. 195  Regardless, commentators observe that, as a matter of practice, 
managers routinely take into account a range of competing interests and priorities in 
reaching decisions on behalf of the corporation and must do so without the benefit of 
hindsight and perfect information about the ultimate effect of their decisions on the 
financial success of the corporation, however defined.196 Indeed, as Elhauge notes, ―pure 
profit-maximization does not empirically appear to be a prevalent social norm‖ among 
investors or corporate managers.197  
 
 194. For a discussion of the primary mechanisms for motivating firms to internalize some of these costs, 
see supra Part IV.B.3. The firm may, of course, be able to avoid doing so in cases where managerial decisions 
and their impact are not publicly disclosed. 
 195. See generally Elhauge, supra note 72 (discussing the benefits of managerial discretion to sacrifice 
corporate profits). 
 196. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 55, at 16; Fisch, supra note 68, at 655 (surveying studies of managerial 
practice). 
 197. Elhauge, supra note 72, at 814. 
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b. Enlightened Shareholder Value Decision Standards 
Under an enlightened shareholder value paradigm then, generating long-term 
shareholder wealth is the fundamental objective for corporate decision-making, but 
multiple financial and non-financial stakeholders must be taken into account in the 
pursuit of financial success. Accordingly, ESV decision rules must look beyond quarterly 
earnings or other traditional measures of shareholder value. They must also incorporate 
an assessment of the decision‘s cost impact that is not limited to the anticipated direct 
financial costs incurred by the firm, but instead includes costs borne by other firm 
constituencies that can be reasonably identified and quantified. 
Although enlightened shareholder value has yet to be consistently operationalized as 
a yardstick for management success, there are a number of possible measures of 
―successful‖ decision-making that are consistent with this basic ESV decision rule. I 
consider two here by way of example. As enlightened shareholder value is investor-
driven, these measures are proposed primarily as a standard for operational decision-
making, not for change of control or game-ending corporate decisions, where there is no 
long-term investment horizon. In those cases, existing corporate codes and case law 
governing change of control transactions, which, again, generally permit consideration of 
stakeholder interests, would of course apply.198 
i. Long-Term Firm Value or “Joint Output” 
Although ESV advocates tend to stress its impact in terms of traditional shareholder 
value measures, broader measures of firm value are in fact a better fit with an ESV 
approach. Measures of firm value reflect the joint output of shareholders, employees, 
lenders, communities, and all other contributors to the corporate enterprise. In this regard, 
enlightened shareholder value is largely consistent with Blair and Stout‘s team 
production model of the firm,199 the enlightened stakeholder value model proposed by 
economist Michael Jensen, 200  and other approaches that also specify long-term firm 
value maximization as the firm‘s objective rather than shareholder value.201  
However, an ESV-oriented measure of firm value would potentially incorporate a 
broader range of stakeholders than financial claimants of the firm, as Jensen and Thomas 
Smith have proposed, or those with firm-specific investments, as in the Blair and Stout 
model. Instead, the limiting factor in investor-driven enlightened shareholder value is 
simply what investors identify as having a potentially material effect on firm 
performance, which may include measures of costs borne by the environment, local 
communities, and other non-financial claimants as well.202 Economists and corporate 
 
 198. Supra Part III(A) (surveying these authorities). 
 199. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 29. 
 200. See Jensen, supra note 55, at 8, 12–13 (arguing that joint output can only be measured by a 
comprehensive assessment of firm value that internalizes the costs and returns to all residual financial 
claimants). Jensen excludes non-financial claimants from the definition of ―stakeholders‖ because, in his view, 
the interests of these claimants fall within the scope of externalities properly dealt with through regulation. Id. 
at 12 (―[r]esolving externality and monopoly problems is the legitimate domain of the government‖).  
 201. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 217–18 (1999) (arguing for maximization of the value of all financial 
claims of the corporation). 
 202. At the same time, because investors drive enlightened shareholder value, financial stakeholders whose 
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finance scholars have developed alternative measures of firm value that attempt to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the corporation and might therefore offer better 
metrics to ground an ESV analysis.203 
ii. Two-tier Constrained Optimization 
Other possible rules, while not generally advanced by ESV advocates, are also 
consistent with an ESV approach. One possibility is a two-tier model where decisions 
that are expected to maximize long-term value to shareholders are first identified, and 
then from those, zero-sum options—that is, decisions that are viable only if high costs to 
stakeholders are presumed—are excluded.204 This rule might apply, for example, when 
weighing the business, political, and reputational risks associated with a planned foreign 
investment. Again, this approach would not, however, be appropriate in either the Revlon 
context205 or where the firm is insolvent206 and shareholders cease to have long-term 
interests in the firm‘s survival. Conceptually, a two-tier rule would essentially embody 
the principle that the corporation should ―do no harm.‖ The challenge with this type of 
standard is that determining the long-term effect of any decision and then resolving 
inevitable conflicts between stakeholders (and shareholders) affected by the decision is 
inherently difficult. However, the corporation could use this approach as an initial 
decision tool to exclude those options that are reasonably likely to impose severe or 
widespread costs on one or more direct stakeholders of the firm.  
 
interests may overlap less closely with those of shareholders (such as creditors) are not generally represented.  
 203. See generally Bennett Stewart, EVA Momentum: The One Ratio That Tells the Whole Story, 21 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 2, Spring 2009 at 74 (defining EVA Momentum); Terrance Jalbert et al., EVA as a 
Predictor of Firm Performance, 8 J. ACCT. & FIN. RSRCH., no. 3, at 83 (Winter 2000) (advocating economic 
value added (EVA) as a better measure of firm performance than traditional measures of earnings and cash 
flow). But see John M. Griffith, The True Value of EVA, 14 J. APPLIED FIN., no. 2, Winter 2004 at 25 (assessing 
the performance of companies that have implemented the EVA-based compensation system). See also Fisch, 
supra note 68 (surveying this literature and efforts to quantify costs and gains to stakeholder groups). 
 204. A rule which requires management to simultaneously maximize the welfare of all stakeholders (i.e., a 
Pareto optimal result) is not included, since even if it could be achieved, it would not be consistent with the 
enlightened shareholder value model‘s emphasis on shareholder value. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, 
supra note 30, at 910 (―In theory, one could consider management to maximize the overall welfare of all 
corporate constituencies. Courts, however, would be unable to enforce effectively compliance with such a 
principle.‖). Shareholders would likely face similar difficulty. The ―balanced scorecard‖ approach, developed 
by Kaplan and Norton, might also be used to implement an enlightened shareholder value decision rule. See 
Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard—Measures That Drive Performance, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 71–79. However, as Jensen points out, the Balanced Scorecard likewise does not 
provide a single objective standard for guiding how to weigh financial, customer, internal business process, 
learning and growth and other dimensions that together make up the ―scorecard.‖ Jensen, supra note 55, at 17–
21. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 73–76 (discussing Revlon). 
 206. Where the corporation is insolvent, creditors stand ―in the place of shareholders as the residual 
beneficiaries of any increase in value.‖ N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 99, 101 (Del. 2007).  
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2. Enlightened Shareholder Value Decision Rules Under Corporate Law 
All of these decision rules would pass muster under current Delaware corporate law 
and under most state corporate statutes. 207  Moreover, investor-driven enlightened 
shareholder value requires no change in existing corporate governance rules. First, as we 
have seen, corporate directors and officers are not obligated by law to maximize 
shareholder wealth outside the narrow circumstances of a change in control under 
Revlon.208 Second, with regard to the control rules of corporate governance, enlightened 
shareholder value does not presuppose either a shareholder-primacy or director-primacy 
approach and is consistent with existing director-centric governance rules.  
Certainly, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, enlightened 
shareholder value has emerged in a context that gives prominence to shareholder 
interests. An investor-oriented vision of enlightened shareholder value is also supported 
by trends toward greater board accountability to shareholders. However, investor 
activism around ESG risk and other stakeholder issues presumes that directors have the 
broad discretion afforded by current law to consider stakeholder interests. Moreover, 
disclosure of ESG risks and implementation of an enlightened shareholder value vision at 
the firm level depends on the initiative and leadership of corporate boards. As Elhauge 
observes, directors are well-positioned to bear direct responsibility for the corporations‘ 
impact on stakeholders, since they possess inside information on corporate operations and 
directly bear the shame of public relations ―sanctions.‖209 Finally, in an era where more 
voices are weighing in on the direction of the corporation, there is clear value in 
preserving the board‘s traditional role as a central decision maker with the power of 
―fiat,‖ as Bainbridge has urged.210 While shareholder empowerment gives shareholders 
greater space to define corporate accountability, the fundamental balance of current law 
gives corporate boards the necessary freedom to balance competing interests and make 
decisions for the long-term benefit of the firm as a whole. 
Enlightened shareholder value also poses no challenge to the current choice of the 
shareholder as the constituency that enjoys monitoring and enforcement rights under 
corporate law.211 Notwithstanding fears of some that proxy access will open the door for 
―constituency‖ directors, institutional investors have not pushed for stakeholders to have 
a direct voice in corporate affairs—for example, by giving employees a seat on the board, 
nor are they likely to urge that fiduciary duties, voting rights, or other shareholder 
privileges be extended to other stakeholders—even if state corporate codes and corporate 
 
 207. See generally supra Part III (discussing the role of stakeholders under corporate law). 
 208. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 209. See Elhauge, supra note 72, at 800 (discussing the benefits of managerial discretion to sacrifice 
corporate profits). 
 210. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3 (discussing the means and ends of corporate 
governance). 
 211. This is in contrast to communitarian visions of corporate governance that would give multiple 
stakeholders direct voice in corporate affairs. Progressive corporate scholars have called for multi-stakeholder 
fiduciary duties that would obligate managers to weigh stakeholder and shareholder concerns in corporate 
decision-making. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed., 1995). See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder preeminence under 
corporate law). 
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boards authorized them to do so.212 Unless this changes, stakeholders will not gain direct 
voice in firm governance. The primary impact of enlightened shareholder value, then, is 
to harness investor power to lend indirect force to stakeholder concerns. 
B. Normative Advantages of Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Although enlightened shareholder value implies decision rules that differ in some 
key respects from shareholder wealth maximization, it also offers strong normative 
advantages as a statement of the corporate purpose. The implications of enlightened 
shareholder value are potentially far broader than those presented here. Nonetheless, the 
following are areas where these contributions are most apparent. 
1. Of Law and Markets 
Normative arguments in favor of shareholder wealth maximization rest on two 
primary economic rationales. The first is that maximizing shareholder wealth increases 
the entire corporate pie, redounding to the benefit of all stakeholders.213 The second is 
that the corporation‘s single-minded pursuit of profits generates the greatest welfare gains 
to society as a whole.214 ESV decision rules revise these standard arguments in ways that 
address some of the limits of law and of markets better than pure shareholder wealth 
maximization.  
One such limit concerns negative externalities. As Bainbridge explains, if—as is 
typically assumed—nonshareholders have a priority fixed claim on firm assets while 
shareholders have a residual claim, then shareholder wealth maximization only generates 
net benefits to nonshareholders in the absence of externalities.215 However, where the 
firm takes a course of action that is relatively risky, ―[t]he increased return associated 
with an increase in risk does not benefit nonshareholders because their claim is fixed, 
 
 212. Any such change could only be accomplished through a charter amendment initiated by the board. 
Such an amendment would be contrary to current state corporate code provisions, which limit these rights to 
shareholders, or in the exceptional case, to creditors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 211–22 (2010) 
(discussing shareholder meetings, elections, voting, and notice rights). Note also that the U.K. Companies Act 
of 2006 does not extend direct monitoring or enforcement rights to stakeholders either. U.K. Companies Act of 
2006, §§ 260–69, pt. 11 (affording members the right to enforce management fiduciary duties through 
derivative litigation). 
 213. In brief, the theory states that shareholder primacy compensates shareholders for bearing greater risk 
than fixed claimants with a priority claim, and thus gives ultimate control to those with the strongest interest in 
maximizing the surplus and thus the entire economic pie. Employees, creditors, and other stakeholders are 
generally assumed to be fixed claimants. See Hansmaan & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 449. 
 214. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 67, at 38 (stating that ―maximizing profits for equity 
investors assists the other ‗constituencies‘ automatically‖); Jensen, supra note 55, at 11 (―200 years‘ worth of 
work in economics and finance indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt 
to maximize their own total firm value.‖). Other arguments rest on the identification of shareholders as the legal 
owners of the corporation. Although the shareholder-owner‘s strong rhetorical appeal has brought it back into 
circulation in support of shareholder democracy, this view has already been assailed on a number of practical 
and theoretical grounds. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (citing the shareholder ownership theory as ―the worst[] of the standard 
arguments for shareholder primacy‖); Fisch, supra note 68, at 648–50 (summarizing the ownership argument 
and its limits as a justification for shareholder primacy). 
 215. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 585 n.182 (but concluding that the externalities 
argument is overstated). 
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whereas the simultaneous increase in the corporation‘s riskiness makes it less likely that 
nonshareholder claims will be satisfied.‖216 If, on the other hand, as Jensen and others 
have recognized, shareholders are not in fact the sole residual claimants of the firm—
indeed, employees and local communities often are as well—then shareholder value 
alone is not coextensive with firm value. 217  Under either view the conclusion that 
shareholder wealth maximization increases firm value, and therefore social value, may 
not hold true. 
Enlightened shareholder value offers a response to these challenges. ESV 
proponents assert, in essence, that maximizing firm value maximizes shareholder wealth, 
not the other way around.218 As I have argued, such a decision rule is more likely to 
encourage firms to recognize and internalize risks to stakeholders than pure shareholder 
wealth maximization.219 ESV‘s emphasis on the need to account for broader stakeholder 
concerns also meshes better with empirical findings that gains to shareholders are often 
generated simply by wealth transfers from other stakeholders, thus resulting in little or no 
net gain to the firm.220 Finally, ESV implicitly asserts that even when shareholder and 
stakeholder interests diverge, the firm‘s externalizing of some costs to multiple 
stakeholders may reduce long-term shareholder value and increase the level of risk 
assumed by the firm. Thus, even under a pure shareholder wealth maximization approach 
it may not be possible to maximize shareholder economic value when these factors are 
excluded from the analysis. ESV‘s emphasis on the intersections of stakeholder interests 
and shareholder value therefore offers useful revisions of some of these standard 
rationales. 
With regard to the argument that profit maximization is best for society as a whole, 
enlightened shareholder value also implies the inverse of the standard argument: 
companies that do good for society will do well in the market, a proposition that has 
some empirical support.221 In addition, ESV implies that the public spillover benefits of 
firm operations may be offset by costs and risks to stakeholders that are neither 
adequately addressed under current law nor known to the markets.222 In particular, the 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. In other words, some stakeholder claims are not fixed but are in fact residual. See supra text 
accompanying notes 199–202 (distinguishing shareholder value and firm value). Jill Fisch observes that if 
stakeholder interests cannot be assumed to be adequately protected by contract, a point addressed infra, then 
stakeholders are also residual claimants, and ―[i]f nonshareholders can be residual claimants or corporate 
decisions can transfer value between stakeholders, then maximizing shareholder value is not the equivalent of 
maximizing firm value.‖ Fisch, supra note 68, at 659–60 (reviewing empirical support finding these conditions 
met as a matter of corporate practice). 
 218. See supra Part IV.B.2 (explaining the rationales behind ESG-oriented investing). 
 219. See supra Part IV.A (proposing decision rules compatible with enlightened shareholder value). 
 220. A number of studies show, for example, that the value to shareholders produced by a takeover is often 
offset by the losses to employees. See, e.g., Andrei Schliefer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in 
Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach, ed. 1988).  
 221. See supra notes 119–20 (surveying early empirical studies finding a positive correlation between 
corporate social performance and financial performance). 
 222. In contrast to the standard argument that shareholder wealth maximization produces the greatest social 
welfare, ESV also acknowledges explicitly that nonshareholders‘ interests in increasing firm value may not be 
coextensive with shareholder interest in profit-maximization and may thus deserve separate consideration. See 
Chen & Hanson, supra note 53, at 47 (―[The claim that increased firm value increases social welfare] assumes 
that the interests of nonshareholders are aligned with those [profit-maximizing interests] of shareholders.‖).  
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emphasis of ESV proponents on environmental, social, and even human rights risks 
highlights the inadequacy of legal and contractual protections for involuntary 
stakeholders (i.e., employees of foreign suppliers, the environment, and distant tort 
claimants) and for other stakeholders of global corporations beyond the jurisdictional 
reach of U.S. law and courts.223 Pressure from investors, among others, may help fill 
these gaps. 
2. The Nature of the Corporate Contract 
A further normative argument in favor of shareholder wealth maximization and 
other dimensions of shareholder primacy is that it is an implied term of the hypothetical 
and real contracts between the firm and its various constituencies. Because shareholders 
lack the legal and contractual protections available to other stakeholders, so the argument 
goes, they would not agree to invest in long-term, capital-intensive projects of the firm if 
shareholder primacy were not part of the corporate contract (or would do so only at a 
higher rate of return).224 Assuming here the theoretical utility of a nexus of contracts 
understanding of the firm, it can at least be said that enlightened shareholder value 
implies a revision of the corporate contract argument that is a better fit with the emerging 
realities of global public corporations.  
That shareholder wealth maximization is an assumed term of the contract is 
generally justified on grounds that shareholders are relatively powerless to defend their 
own interests, that nonshareholders are adequately protected by law or contract, and 
finally, that the rule is the one most likely to maximize firm value and is therefore the 
rule that the contracting parties would have reached had they explicitly bargained for 
it.225 However, while legal and contractual protections may be adequate protection for 
many stakeholders, we have already seen that they do not generally extend to many 
stakeholders of global corporations. With the rise of powerful institutional investors and 
lower barriers to shareholder activism, the claim that shareholders are in need of 
particular protection under corporate law has also lost some of its rhetorical force.226  
 
 223. These include foreign communities and workers who cannot be presumed to be protected by law, the 
democratic process, or even, an implicit contract. Because most corporate law scholarship assumes that 
corporations operate within a (single) democratic political system that can be relied on to address distributional 
and equitable effects generated by the market, the limits of international law in extending such protections 
globally are rarely considered. For a thorough discussion of the problem, see generally Cynthia Williams, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002). See 
also Elhauge, supra note 72, at 803–04 (noting the limits of law as a constraint on corporate conduct, in part 
because ―variations in legal regulation among different nations . . . inevitably leave legal gaps requiring 
supplementation by social and moral sanctions that operate internationally‖).  
 224. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 600. See also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 67, at 36 (positing that shareholders as residual claimants implicitly contract for the promise that the 
firm will maximize long term returns to shareholders). 
 225. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 53, at 52–66 (―[S]cholars have offered a seemingly watertight set of 
arguments for why [the privileged] constituency should be shareholders. . . . (1) [O]ther stakeholders don‘t need 
the protection of corporate managers and corporate law, (2) shareholders do; and in any event, . . . (3) the 
pressures that product markets, capital markets, and labor markets create constrain[] directors and managers, 
eliminating any discretion to pursue the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.‖) (citations omitted). The 
Delaware courts have held specifically that creditors are limited to the protection of contract and regulatory 
rights. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007). 
 226. The choice of the shareholder as the stakeholder to whom corporate law grants monitoring and 
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Moreover, it is no longer certain that pure shareholder wealth maximization that 
excludes stakeholders is the decision standard that all shareholders would inevitably 
reach with other corporate stakeholders and firms. Indeed, many investors are, through 
various forms of activism, explicitly negotiating the terms of their continued investment 
directly with portfolio firms to ensure that the corporation generates solid returns but also 
gives due consideration to ESG issues.227 Traditional theories maintain that investors 
would demand a risk premium on their investment—that is, a higher rate of return—if 
managers were free to ―make tradeoffs‖ between shareholders and stakeholders. 228 
However, the behavior of ESV-oriented investors and their allies among social investors 
suggests that, at least for them, the traditional assumption does not fit. Rather, these 
shareholders have concluded that firm-level risks are actually reduced when management 
takes both voluntary and involuntary stakeholders into account and that it is in fact failure 
to make some tradeoffs preferencing stakeholders that might increase long-term risks to 
shareholders, justifying a risk premium.  
3. Of Means and Ends 
Finally, traditional shareholder wealth maximization assumes that the ends of the 
corporation (i.e., advancing the private, economic interests of shareholders) can be 
distinguished from the choice of appropriate means to achieve that goal, a task which is 
left to management discretion, constrained, if necessary, by laws passed by duly elected 
public officials. 229  However, given the reputational risk of ―irresponsible‖ business 
practices, shareholder economic interests are increasingly directly linked to the economic 
and even non-economic interests of stakeholders. Enlightened shareholder value better 
recognizes that it is perhaps no longer possible to make useful distinctions between the 
private and public roles of the firm.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the normative benefits of maintaining the means/ends 
and public/private distinctions underlying the shareholder wealth maximization norm will 
likely remain the subject of debate. Nonetheless, the range of issues raised through 
various forms of shareholder activism shows clearly that many shareholders are in fact as 
concerned about the means by which shareholder value is achieved as they are in returns 
on investment. 230  Enlightened shareholder value thus also better comports with the 
observed reality that shareholders increasingly expect corporations to be directly 
accountable for how their money is spent.  
 
enforcement rights may, however, still be justified on grounds that shareholders‘ interests are generally 
speaking most closely aligned with the interests of all of the firm‘s stakeholders. 
 227. As Einer Elhauge notes, ―maximizing shareholder welfare is not the same thing as maximizing 
shareholder profits,‖ in part because many shareholders derive nonfinancial benefits from socially and morally 
desirable corporate activities. Elhauge, supra note 72, at 783–96. Although ESV-oriented investors generally 
demand returns on investment that meet or exceed market levels, the level of return on investment that 
shareholders are willing to sacrifice in exchange for these nonfinancial benefits will inevitably vary.  
 228. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 600. 
 229. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 61 (arguing that corporate officers should not improperly assume a 
public role by promoting social responsibility, and affirming the importance of law and ethical norms in 
constraining executives‘ conduct). 
 230. Shareholder proposals seeking to set limits on executive compensation, and social proposals urging, 
for example, disinvestment from Sudan, illustrate this point equally. Both reflect investor concerns about the 
means by which firm success is achieved. 
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4. Stakeholder Representation 
This Article has argued that many stakeholder interests are compatible with the 
economic interests of shareholders and the corporations they invest in. The following 
subpart addresses the challenges raised by areas in which those interests may not be so 
aligned. However, assuming those arguments prove convincing, further normative 
objections might still be raised about whether investor advocacy of stakeholder interests 
is in fact good for stakeholders and if so, whether investors are in fact better positioned 
than regulatory authorities, corporate boards, or stakeholders themselves, to advance and 
protect stakeholder interests.  
While there is not space here to provide a complete response to this question, a few 
observations are in order. First, it is doubtful that indirect representation by institutional 
shareholders fully and accurately reflects the true interests of stakeholders. What is 
material to a given stakeholder constituency, even from a strictly economic standpoint, 
may not be material to the firm or to large portfolio investors. Second, because any 
voluntary ESV approach inevitably gives institutional investors and corporate directors 
and officers the power to define, select, and prioritize the stakeholder interests they will 
advance, investors and boards are inevitably framing how stakeholder interests are 
perceived by corporate managers and which will be deemed ―material.‖ Particularly for 
financial stakeholders, such as creditors and to a lesser extent employees, investor voice 
will generally be an imperfect substitute for direct protections that may be provided 
through contract, protective legislation, or direct stakeholder engagement with firm 
management. Nonetheless, shareholders can and do advance certain stakeholder interests, 
and investor advocacy can amplify stakeholder voice where these mechanisms are weak.  
This is particularly so in the case of ―involuntary‖ stakeholders—such as the 
environment, foreign workers, and victims of human rights violations—for whom 
regulatory and contractual mechanisms may not be available or enforceable. Even if 
domestic, foreign, and international regulation is strengthened, ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
approaches will inevitably be imperfect and in many cases, unenforceable. For these 
stakeholders, investor activism that motivates firms to ―self-regulate‖ by identifying and 
reducing risks and harms to these constituencies can provide an important supplement to 
market pressure from NGOs and consumers and reinforce existing contractual and 
regulatory protections.231 
C. Enlightened Shareholder Value & The “Problem” of Stakeholders: Responding to 
Efficiency-based Concerns 
Since Berle and Dodd began their famous debate over the nature and purpose of the 
corporation, any significant movement within academic and popular discourse in the 
direction of shareholder primacy has caused an equal and opposite movement away from 
the stakeholder model and its emphasis on corporate obligations to broader 
constituencies.232 Not surprisingly, one can chart the ebb and flow of the corporate social 
responsibility movement itself along much the same historical trajectory.233 Over the past 
 
 231. On corporate self-regulation see generally PARKER, supra note 189.  
 232. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 53 (tracing the history and origins of the debate). 
 233. See Branson, supra note 15 (tracing the history of corporate social responsibility in relation to 
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decade, however, the lines between these categories have begun to blur.234 Enlightened 
shareholder value promises to dissolve some of the remaining boundaries, paving the way 
toward more integrated conceptualizations of the corporation and its purpose. Where then 
does enlightened shareholder value leave us in considering the ―problem‖ of stakeholders 
that is behind much of the debates over corporate governance reform? 
1. “Too Little” Attention to Stakeholders 
The first area of concern is that shareholder power might cause management to give 
too little attention to stakeholders. This Article suggests that such assumptions are no 
longer well-founded. As Part IV of this Article highlights, ―enlightened shareholder 
value‖ is in fact already gaining traction among influential mainstream institutional 
investors and might ultimately motivate leading public corporations in a pro-stakeholder 
direction. These trends support findings from Lisa Fairfax‘s survey of investor social 
activism, which provides ample evidence that many institutional investors can and do 
advocate for stakeholders.235 More comprehensive reporting and disclosure of ESG and 
other nonfinancial factors may also facilitate broader public oversight of corporate 
activities that affect stakeholders.  
2. “Too Much” Attention to Stakeholders 
Expanded shareholder influence is, however, problematic for those concerned about 
the potentially efficiency-reducing effects of shareholder representation of stakeholder 
interests. The ESV model responds in part to these concerns by showing that accounting 
for stakeholders in investment and ultimately managerial decision making can generate 
long-term shareholder wealth. Thus, efficiency-based rationales at both the investor and 
the firm levels actually ground enlightened shareholder value, which has the potential to 
make headway in the mainstream investment and business communities precisely for that 
reason.  
Still, it might be argued that ESV decision rules, like other stakeholder-oriented 
decision rules, are nonetheless efficiency-reducing because they give ―too much‖ 
attention to stakeholders. Essentially, the arguments are that stakeholder-oriented rules: 
(i) lack the practical simplicity of a single maximand, exacerbating agency problems (the 
―two masters‖ problem); and (ii) directly or indirectly advance ―private,‖ political, or 
social interests that distract from the mission of the firm. These important criticisms have 
been reinvigorated in the course of the shareholder empowerment debate, and are ones to 
which enlightened shareholder value offers a more satisfying response than pure 
stakeholder models.236  
 
corporate governance). 
 234. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 80 (identifying some of these trends). 
 235. See generally Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy, supra note 17. 
 236. Stakeholder-oriented theories generally maintain that the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders should be weighed equally in managerial decision making or that other stakeholder interests, such 
as those of employees, should take precedence. For a survey of stakeholder theories, see Thomas Donaldson & 
Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 65 (1995). 
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a. A Response to the “Two Masters” Problem 
The strongest argument for the shareholder wealth maximization norm is that it 
keeps corporate managers accountable to shareholders by setting a single clear 
standard—maximizing shareholder wealth, as reflected in the share price. Conversely, 
one of the strongest criticisms of pro-stakeholder theories is that they leave managers 
without a standard for choosing among competing stakeholder interests. This multiplicity 
of interests provides a cover for management self-interest, which is the essence of the 
―two masters‖ problem.237 In the words of Easterbrook and Fischel 
a manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for 
the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither. Faced with 
a demand from either group, the manager can appeal to the interests of the 
other. Agency costs rise and social wealth falls.238  
Enlightened shareholder value, like shareholder wealth maximization, overcomes these 
obstacles by placing creation of long-term shareholder value as the single objective 
standard.239 However, ESV-oriented investors expect management decision making to 
satisfy an additional criterion—that is, to be justified with reference to stakeholders, 
whether by avoiding harms to stakeholders that pose a material risk of future loss to the 
firm, or by seeking opportunities to generate wealth in a way that also benefits 
stakeholders.240 Such a decision rule raises no greater practical difficulties than in the 
current context of corporate decision-making, where managers routinely confront 
demands from competing shareholder and stakeholder constituencies. Moreover, even 
when internalizing costs to stakeholders means that the firm foregoes some increase in 
the level of profits it would otherwise have enjoyed (and is therefore to some extent 
profit-sacrificing), agency costs cannot be assumed to rise inevitably. 241  As Einer 
Elhauge has observed, managers are effectively restrained by market forces and social 
and moral sanctions from excessive profit-sacrificing behavior—in other words, there are 
limits on agency slack.242 Accordingly, profit-sacrificing decisions made in the ―public 
interest‖ can actually reduce the type of self-interested, profit-sacrificing behavior that is 
at the heart of the ―two masters‖ critique.243  
 
 237. Id. See also Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 30, at 910–11. 
 238. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 67, at 38. 
 239. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 600 (explaining that under shareholder wealth 
maximization, ―if the board considers the interests of nonshareholder constituencies when making decisions, it 
does so only because shareholder wealth will be maximized in the long run‖). But see Blair & Stout, supra note 
29, at 304 (disputing this view based on evidence from the takeover context). 
 240. This is an advantage of Jensen‘s ―enlightened stakeholder model‖ as well. See Jensen, supra note 55, 
at 9 (arguing that ―to maximize firm value, managers must not only satisfy, but enlist the support of, all 
corporate stakeholders‖). 
 241. See, e.g., supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing primacy mechanisms for motivating firms 
to internalize agency costs). 
 242. Elhauge, supra note 72, at 805–14, 846–47 (noting that there is also no legal prohibition on such an 
exercise of managerial discretion). 
 243. Id. 
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b. A Response to the Problem of Private Interests 
The question of ―private‖ or ―special‖ interests poses more difficulty for an 
enlightened shareholder paradigm. Here, the basic concern is that the most activist 
shareholders, namely, large public pension funds, union funds, and hedge funds (which, 
with the exception of hedge funds, are also among the foremost advocates of an 
enlightened shareholder value approach) might use their power to advance their own 
private, political, or constituency interests, transferring value from other shareholders or 
stakeholders to select shareholders.244 Shareholders might also align with management 
against stakeholders for reasons not shared by the shareholder class.245 Both concerns 
resonate strongly with critics of greater shareholder power.  
At the outset, we should dispel the false notion that these problems do not arise 
under shareholder wealth maximization. Since shareholder voice is now a part of the 
landscape in which public corporations must operate, then the artificial uni-dimensional 
wealth maximizing shareholder has already been replaced by a heterogeneous, dynamic 
contingent of mostly fiduciary shareholders, who together with their beneficiaries, have 
real and diverse interests that include, but may extend beyond wealth maximization.246 
Therefore, the assumption that all shareholders are long-term wealth maximizers is now 
less theoretically and practically useful. While courts may continue to rely on this fiction 
for its simplicity,247 shareholder voice clearly means that what real investors want, in all 
its variety, matters both to management and to other shareholders who likely will have 
quite different views.  
The enlightened shareholder value approach does not itself resolve all of these 
challenges. It cautions, however, that shareholder activism that aligns with stakeholders 
or that constrains the means of generating profits should not be suspect as per se 
―impermissible.‖ Specifically, the fact that public pensions, labor union funds, and other 
activist institutional investors owe duties to diverse constituencies with both economic 
and non-economic goals does not necessarily present a threat to long-term value creation. 
While further empirical research on the impact of ESV-oriented investing, for example, 
under the rubric of the PRI, on firm behavior is needed, 248  ESV-oriented investor 
activism has the potential to encourage companies to pursue value-increasing 
environmental and social goals that they might otherwise neglect, or deter activities that 
create a high risk of harm to other stakeholders that may ultimately be value-decreasing 
for the firm. Therefore, discouraging institutional investor voice on ―public‖ or 
 
 244. See, e.g., Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 17, at 1285–86 (citing CalPERS proxy campaign to oust 
Safeway‘s president and pressure Safeway in labor negotiations). 
 245. See supra note 51 (discussing these concerns). 
 246. For the most comprehensive treatment of the fictional wealth-maximizing shareholder, see Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1021 (1996). However, the heterogeneity of even the economic interests of shareholders challenges the 
traditional view that a single maximand can be achieved by relying on trends in share prices. Anabtawi, supra 
note 51, at 575.  
 247. See Greenwood, supra note 246, at 1025–26, 1058–65 (referring to the shareholder wealth maximizing 
shareholder as a ―legal fiction‖ and demonstrating its reflection in case law). 
 248. For a survey of recent empirical findings on the impact of SRI and ESV-oriented investing on various 
measures of corporate performance, see MERCER, SHEDDING LIGHT ON RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (Nov. 2009) 
(available by subscription). 
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―stakeholder‖ issues because it may be a cover for self-interest, collusion, or managerial 
protectionism runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, resulting in lost 
benefits to stakeholders and shareholders as well. Instead, it is possible to leave space for 
enlightened shareholder value by narrowing the class of ―private‖ interests that pose 
concern.  
There are essentially two forms of ―impermissible‖ (i.e., value-decreasing) private 
interests: self-interest (rent-seeking, opportunism, and ―hold-up‖) and collusion with 
management (―gang-up‖). Activism conducted for these purposes is impermissible not 
because it might advance the interests of labor unions or the agenda of a prominent 
environmental NGO, but because it confers a unique economic benefit on the activist that 
is not shared by the shareholder class.249 It is reasonable to assume that the motivations 
of ESV proponents, like other investors, will not be uniform. However, because 
enlightened shareholder value focuses on wealth-enhancing corporate reform and 
advancing broader definitions of corporate accountability, ESV-oriented investors should 
generally oppose misuse of activist power for solely ―private‖ or ―special interest‖ 
purposes.  
A full analysis of potential solutions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a 
number of possibilities have already been proposed that would mitigate these risks and 
allow firms (and markets) to reap the benefits of value-enhancing investor activism. First, 
the majority voting rule already offers some protection against impermissible activism. 
Although majority voting will not necessarily prevent all abuses of shareholder power,250 
it clearly does deter some degree of self-interested activism. The deterrent effect is 
arguably stronger when investors are engaging in direct social activism, since social 
proposals historically have attracted less support from non-proponent investor groups.251 
For example, recent studies of ―say-on-pay‖ shareholder proposals have found that labor-
union-initiated proposals targeting firms where CEO pay was not in fact excessive 
generally received lower support from other shareholders.252  
Other proposals that offer strong potential deterrents for impermissible activism 
would extend controlling shareholder fiduciary duties to all activist shareholders,253 or 
strengthen the transparency and accountability of fiduciary institutions, such as pension 
funds, to fund beneficiaries and other stakeholders. Such measures might include 
 
 249. Anabtawi and Stout‘s arguments in favor of fiduciary duties for activist shareholders make the same 
distinction. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 17, at 1284. 
 250. See Anabtawi, supra note 51, at 593–97 (illustrating how binary shareholder voting is not a reliable 
way to produce outcomes that increase shareholder value when shareholders have private interests). 
 251. See Buchanan, supra note 25, at 5; Fairfax, supra note 17, at 58–59. 
 252. Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?, J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANAL. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 5–6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030925. See also Yonca 
Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 2–4), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443455 (concluding based on similar findings that union pension funds are not more 
likely to target unionized firms or firms with labor-related negotiations but that ―shareholders have judiciously 
used their voting power‖ with respect to say on pay). Labor union funds also typically oppose management-
sponsored director nominees and executive compensation plans, according to one study of proxy voting by 
AFL-CIO pension funds. See Yermack, supra note 23, at 18 (citing A.K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance 
Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (NYU Working Paper Series No. Fin-08-
006) (2008)). 
 253. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 17, at 1294–1303; Rose, supra note 51, at 46–49. 
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expanding beneficiary roles in pension fund governance or requiring institutional 
investors and/or management to publicly disclose activists‘ identity, conflicts of interest, 
their motivation and means of exercising activism, and possibly, the substance of any 
negotiations between the company and the activist.254 The recent enactment of new Rule 
14a-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires disclosure regarding 
shareholder nominees and the nominating shareholder or group,255 and new disclosures 
required for institutional investment managers under the ―say on pay‖ provisions of new 
Section 14A of the ‗34 Act,256 are efforts to implement some of these recommendations 
and represent positive steps toward greater transparency of shareholder activism.  
Further answers also lie in where the boundaries for shareholder activism have been 
and may be set in the course of ongoing corporate governance reforms. Limits to proxy 
access, for example, such as ownership stake requirements, limits on the number of 
―access‖ seats, and the mandatory disclosure rules for proponents of access candidates 
described above, which have been recently adopted by the SEC reflect a measured 
approach that if ultimately successful should alleviate some of the objections to investor-
driven enlightened shareholder value raised earlier.257 The need to address shareholder 
heterogeneity and conflicts of interest also points ultimately to the value of maintaining 
the fundamental director-oriented control rules, such as a strong business judgment rule, 
as an important safeguard against impermissible uses of shareholder power, even as 
investors serve as a check on managerial self-interest. In light of these rules and the 
availability of targeted solutions to the types of activism that pose concern, one should 
not view the fact that shareholders may use their power to advance the interests of 
stakeholders as inherently problematic from an efficiency standpoint.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The global financial crisis has produced profound skepticism about the power of 
markets to right all wrongs and has renewed interest in the tools of public regulation. But, 
as Mark Roe observed over a decade ago, there is reason to doubt that legal change alone 
will lead to structural or institutional change in the actors and relationships that are 
entrenched in the economy. 258  What is interesting about the present moment is the 
confluence of market and regulatory changes that has given investors greater influence in 
corporate governance. Equally interesting is that leading institutional investors are 
 
 254. See Rose, supra note 51, at 50–59; DAVIS, supra note 112, at 140–73 (considering increased fiduciary 
disclosure requirements, ―pass-through‖ proxy voting, beneficiary nomination of pension trustees, and other 
measures to increase beneficiaries‘ monitoring). See also Keith T. Johnson & Frank Jan de Graaf, Modernizing 
Pension Fund Legal Standards for the Twenty-First Century, 2 ROTMAN INT‘L J. PENSION MGMT. 46 (2009) 
(advocating pension fund governance reforms, including increased reporting requirements, greater beneficiary 
representation on fund boards, external audits of practices to avoid conflicts of interest, and reporting of efforts 
to align fund manager incentives with beneficiaries‘ long-term interests). 
 255. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18. See also Regulation 14N, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n (requiring disclosures on 
Schedule 14N of a proponent‘s intent to nominate a director candidate under Rule 14a-11).  
 256. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010), § 951. 
 257. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 40. 
 258. ROE, supra note 16, at 275 (positing that ―[l]egal change alone might not lead to structural change‖ in 
long-standing ownership and governance structures given economic, political, and institutional forces that favor 
the status quo). 
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beginning to use their power to advance stakeholder-oriented approaches to 
accountability, risk management, and governance that challenge conventional 
understandings of corporate accountability. 
As we have seen, enlightened shareholder value represents just such an alternative 
vision and one that offers theoretical and normative advantages over the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm. It also offers principled responses to many of the concerns 
surrounding shareholder empowerment and rising shareholder activism. Recent 
regulatory initiatives at the state and federal levels, such as efforts to improve disclosure 
of corporate risk management policies, clarify standards for corporate non-financial 
reporting, make institutional investor activism more transparent to fund beneficiaries, and 
discourage short-termism across the financial services industry may well move 
corporations more quickly in this direction. This Article has considered some of the 
implications of such a shift for managerial decision making and suggested intersections 
between enlightened shareholder value and emerging corporate governance rules.  
Yet whether regulatory changes lend support or not, investor-driven ―enlightened 
shareholder value‖ shows that the practice of corporate governance has already moved 
beyond the shareholder–stakeholder divide. The challenge for future corporate 
governance reform and scholarship is now how best to optimize the contributions of 
stakeholders, shareholders, and corporate boards to firm success in light of this reality. 
How this balance will ultimately be set for public corporations remains to be seen. But if 
the ascendancy of shareholder primacy itself is any guide, emerging market-driven norms 
like enlightened shareholder value might ultimately shape the ―rules of the game‖ for 
corporations as much or more than positive legal rules. 
